









THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.





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# THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG

VOL. II



LONDON  
GEORGE BELL AND SONS

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NAWAB SALAR JUNG BAHADUR.





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ARRIAN'S  
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

OF FINERY IN DRESS.

A CERTAIN young man a rhetorician came to see Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style ; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and

a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature ; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly ; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous ; and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.<sup>1</sup> It is so, said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is

<sup>1</sup> A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line,

Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling.

Compare Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 5.

this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful; but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly (*αἰσχυρόν*), even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful.

Further I do not know what to say to you; for if I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps leave the school and not return to it; and if I do not say what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say, What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word? did he so ~~much~~ despair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to reason? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a



Polemon;<sup>2</sup> yet he might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me dressed like—what shall I say?—he kept silent. I do not say like what; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress.

If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defence shall I make? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for the oracle?<sup>3</sup> Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth? I indeed do not know whether you will be persuaded by me or not; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded, and yet he spoke. But

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253—

Quaero, faciasne quod olim  
Mutatus Polemon? etc.

The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. See Epict. iv. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child Oedipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius.

why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the words "Know yourself" written in front of the temple, though no person takes any notice of them?

Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges? "If you acquit me on these conditions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist; but I will go up both to young and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now; and most particularly will I do this to you, my fellow-citizens, because you are more nearly related to me."<sup>4</sup>—Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a busybody? and how does it concern you how we act? and what is that you say? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. Who then are you?—Here it is a great thing to say, "I am he whose duty it is to take care of men; for it is

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Apology*, i. 9, etc., and c. 17.

not every little heifer which dares to resist a lion; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, 'and who are you, and what business have you here?'" Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels, Who then are you? If you do, it will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a thing as the purple in a garment;<sup>5</sup> do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men.

What then? am I such a man? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can listen to the truth? I wish you were. But however, since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way, nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are, and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by "rationally"? Conformably to nature<sup>6</sup> and completely. What then

<sup>5</sup> i. 2, note 4.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 11; Horace, *Epp.* i. 10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his *Sermons* says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is "a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true."

do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appearances?<sup>7</sup> No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify this ; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you a man or woman? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman? Woman is naturally smooth and delicate ; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair ; and if he has no hair, he is a monster ; but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible sight ! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man, what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then? was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter : set to work then

<sup>7</sup> The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals ; a rational use of them is peculiar to man (Mrs. Carter, *Introd.* § 7).

upon the whole business. Take away—what is its name?—that which is the cause of the hairs ; make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken ; do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them as a man. Well ; but they like smooth men. Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a praefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up.

Do not so, I entreat you by the gods, young man ; but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, “Epictetus has not said this to me ; for how could he? but some propitious god through him ; for it would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then, let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger.” You say, No.

But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies anything to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies anything through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the poet says :

For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent  
Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer,  
The husband not to kill nor wed the wife.<sup>8</sup>

Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him (Aegisthus)? And now the gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will (*προαίρεσις*); and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men, Alcibiades: Try

<sup>8</sup> From the *Odyssey*, i. 37, where Zeus is speaking of Aegisthus.

then to be beautiful. What does he say to him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How with the body? Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things: intrust them to him. What then, must a man be uncleaned? Certainly not; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say, No; but let us also pluck out the lion's mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's comb, for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog.

## CHAPTER II.

IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED  
WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; AND THAT  
WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS.

THERE are three things (topics, *τόποι*) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.<sup>1</sup> The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire.

<sup>1</sup> See note 1 at end.

The second concerns the movements (towards an object) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents (*συγκαταβάσεις*). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (*τὰ πάθη*, perturbations); for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes men envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects (*ἀπαθῆν*) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (*σχέσεις*) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.

The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the



third, using sophistical arguments (*μεταπίπτοντας*), making conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception in the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind (*ἀμεταπτοσύνη*)? Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he know? he has only the first principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher.—It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by

stretching out his middle finger?<sup>2</sup> And then, when the man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person ; I have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood ; but when any person shows the man's principles, then he shows him as a man.

Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value not at all your own will (*προαίρεσις*), but you look externally to things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will a certain person say? and what will people think of you? will you be considered a man of learning? Have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you have read Archedemus<sup>3</sup> also, you have everything [that you can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not show us who you are? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us that you are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with everything, blaming everybody, never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Archedemus ; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did<sup>4</sup>—what was the man's name?—Crinis ;

<sup>2</sup> To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him.

<sup>3</sup> For Archedemus, see ii. 4, note 2.

<sup>4</sup> Wolf suggests *ὄρε*. Crinis was a Stoic philosopher men

and he too was proud because he understood Archedemus.

Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not concern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who can say : "I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy ; I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil : let us see how we must deal with sophistical arguments ;<sup>5</sup> let us see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to anything absurd." To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine ; if they choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails.<sup>6</sup>

### CHAPTER III.

WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTISE OURSELVES.

THE material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty ; and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons) ; the land is the matter

tioned by Diogenes Laertius. We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of fright.

<sup>5</sup> See this chapter above.

<sup>6</sup> See note 2 at end.

for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature : and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain ; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil, and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to itself ; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will reject Caesar's coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God.<sup>1</sup>

For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relationship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted ? Yes, for such is my nature ; and this is the coin which God has given me. For this reason, if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and brother and country, and everything. But shall I overlook my own

<sup>1</sup> *Comp. i. 19.*

good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you? Why? I am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection? For who will eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, he receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy [what you want]. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, he will sell for

it that which you want. For another compels him from within, he who has fixed (determined) this coin.<sup>2</sup>

Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul's office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand examination; cast it away: it is nothing to you.

If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched; he has nothing to eat.

<sup>2</sup> See note 3 at end.

We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note on this obscure passage.

## CHAPTER IV.

AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTISANSHIP IN AN UNSEEMLY WAY IN A THEATRE.

THE governor of Epirus having shown his favour to an actor in an unseemly way and being publicly blamed on this account, and afterwards having reported to Epictetus that he was blamed and that he was vexed at those who blamed him, Epictetus said, What harm have they been doing? These men also were acting as partisans, as you were doing. The governor replied, Does then any person show his partisanship in this way? When they see you, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a friend of Caesar and his deputy, showing partisanship in this way, was it not to be expected that they also should show their partisanship in the same way? for if it is not right to show partisanship in this way, do not do so yourself; and if it is right, why are you angry if they followed your example? For whom have the many to imitate except you, who are their superiors? to whose example should they look when they go to the theatre except yours? See how the deputy of Caesar looks on: he has cried out, and I too then will cry out. He springs up from his seat, and I will spring up. His slaves sit in various



parts of the theatre and call out. I have no slaves, but I will myself cry out as much as I can and as loud as all of them together. You ought then to know when you enter the theatre that you enter as a rule and example to the rest how they ought to look at the acting. Why then did they blame you? Because every man hates that which is a hindrance to him. They wished one person to be crowned; you wished another. They were a hindrance to you, and you were a hindrance to them. You were found to be the stronger; and they did what they could; they blamed that which hindered them. What then would you have? That you should do what you please, and they should not even say what they please? And what is the wonder? Do not the husbandmen abuse Zeus when they are hindered by him? do not the sailors abuse him? do they ever cease abusing Caesar? What then? does not Zeus know? is not what is said reported to Caesar? What then does he do? he knows that, if he punished all who abuse him, he would have nobody to rule over. What then? when you enter the theatre, you ought to say not, Let Sophron (some actor) be crowned, but you ought to say this, Come let me maintain my will in this matter so that it shall be conformable to nature: no man is dearer to me than myself. It would be ridiculous then for me to be hurt (injured) in order that another who is an actor may be crowned. Whom then do I wish to gain the prize? Why the actor who

does gain the prize ; and so he will always gain the prize whom I wish to gain it.—But I wish Sophron to be crowned. Celebrate as many games as you choose in your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But in public do not claim more than your due, nor attempt to appropriate to yourself what belongs to all. If you do not consent to this, bear being abused ; for when you do the same as the many, you put yourself on the same level with them.

## CHAPTER V.

### AGAINST THOSE WHO ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS GO AWAY HOME.

**I** AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return home.—At home, I suppose, you were free from sickness. Do you not consider whether you are doing anything here which may be useful to the exercise of your will, that it may be corrected ? For if you are doing nothing towards this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling power cannot be maintained in a state conformable to nature, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to increase your money, you will take care of your father in his old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office ; being

had you will do badly anything else that you have to do. But if you understand yourself, and know that you are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in their place, and if you have changed your state of life from things which are not within your will to things which are within your will, and if you ever say, Alas ! you are not saying what you say on account of your father, or your brother, but on account of yourself, do you still allege your sickness ? Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise us while we are doing something ? the husbandman while he is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage ? What would you be doing when death surprises you, for you must be surprised when you are doing something ? If you can be doing anything better than this when you are surprised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I wish to be found practising these things that I may be able to say to God, Have I in any respect transgressed thy commands ? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which thou gavest me ? have I misused my perceptions or my preconceptions (προλήψεις) ?<sup>1</sup> have I ever blamed thee ? have I ever found fault with thy administration ?

<sup>1</sup> On "preconceptions," see i. 2.

I have been sick, because it was thy will, and so have others, but I was content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will, but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office, because it was not thy pleasure that I should ; I have never desired it. Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discontented? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy signals? Is it now thy will that I should depart from the assemblage of men? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administration. May death surprise me while I am thinking of these things, while I am thus writing and reading.

But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick. Go to your mother then ; for you are a fit person to have your head held when you are sick.—But at home I used to lie down on a delicious bed.—Go away to your bed : indeed you are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do not then lose what you can do there (at home).

But what does Socrates say?<sup>2</sup> As one man, he says, is pleased with improving his land, another with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing better. Better in what? in using nice little words? Man,

<sup>2</sup> See note 4 at end.

do not say that. In little matters of speculation (*θεωρήματα*)? what are you saying?—And indeed I do not see what else there is on which philosophers employ their time.—Does it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any person, neither with God nor man? to have blamed nobody? to carry the same face always in going out and coming in? This is what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he knew anything or taught anything.<sup>3</sup> But if any man asked for nice little words or little speculations, he would carry him to Protagoras or to Hippias; and if any man came to ask for potherbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who then among you has this purpose (motive to action)? for if indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by imitating his example (Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 3).

<sup>4</sup> Upton explains this passage thus: "He who loves knows what it is to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal, the chief of beautiful things?"

## CHAPTER VI.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

WHEN some person asked him how it happened that since reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the progress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the progress greater then? For in that in which it has now been more cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and progress is made. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose of maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and do not expect, when you are labouring at one thing to make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a man.

The good man is invincible, for he does not enter the contest where he is not stronger. If you (his adversary) want to have his land and all that is on it, take the land, take his slaves,

take his magisterial office, take his poor body. But you will not make his desire fail in that which it seeks, nor his aversion fall into that which he would avoid. The only contest into which he enters is that about things which are within the power of his will ; how then will he not be invincible ?

Some person having asked him what is Common sense, Epictetus replied, As that may be called a certain Common hearing which only distinguishes vocal sounds, and that which distinguishes musical sounds is not Common, but artificial ; so there are certain things which men, who are not altogether perverted, see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named Common sense.<sup>1</sup>

It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook.<sup>2</sup> But those who have a good natural disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason. Wherefore Rufus<sup>3</sup> generally attempted to discourage (his pupils), and he used this method as a test of those who had a good natural disposition and those who had not. For it was his habit to say, as a stone,

<sup>1</sup> The Greek is κοῖνος νοῦς, the Communis sensus of the Romans, and our Common sense. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 65) speaks of a man who "*communi sensu plane caret*," one who has not the sense or understanding which is the common property of men.

<sup>2</sup> This was a proverb used by Bion, as Diogenes Laertius says. The cheese was new and soft, as the ancients used it.

<sup>3</sup> Rufus is mentioned i. 7, note 12.

if you cast it upwards, will be brought down to the earth by its own nature, so the man whose mind is naturally good, the more you repel him, the more he turns towards that to which he is naturally inclined.

## CHAPTER VII.

### TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.

WHEN the administrator<sup>1</sup> came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who are philosophers,<sup>2</sup> as those who come to a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to

<sup>1</sup> The Greek is διορθωτής. The Latin word is corrector, which occurs in inscriptions and elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> The Epicureans are ironically named philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, i. 8.—Schweighaeuser.



men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus<sup>3</sup> sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him.—Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a certain substance or nature (*οὐσία*) of good, by obtaining which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it shall depend on things of the soul,<sup>4</sup> the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for

<sup>3</sup> Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life.—Dion Cassius, ii. 1108, 1126, Reimar. *us*.

Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived.

<sup>4</sup> *ψυχικαῖς* is Lord Shaftesbury's emendation in place of *ἀγαθῶν*, and it is accepted by Schweighaeuser.

good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing ; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the body ; and again that those bodily things must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good.

For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when he is a judge (*δικαστής*) and able to take it. But, if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done secretly and safely, and so that no man will know it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad,<sup>5</sup> but he admits that detection is ; and because it is impossible to have security against detection, for this reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be detected ; further also, we have powerful friends in Rome, both

<sup>5</sup> Diogenes Laertius (x. 151), quoted by Upton. "Injustice" says Epicurus, "is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion."

men and women, and the Hellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do you refrain from your own good? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is impossible to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth? And why should we not corrupt our neighbour's wife, if we can do it without detection? and if the husband foolishly prates about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you must act thus]. If you would not, you will not differ at all from us who are called Stoics; for we also say one thing, but we do another: we talk of the things which are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is good.<sup>6</sup>

In the name of God, are you thinking of a city of Epicureans? [One man says], "I do not marry."—"Nor I, for a man ought not to marry; nor ought we to beget children, nor engage in

<sup>6</sup> See note 5 at end.

public matters." What then will happen? whence will the citizens come? who will bring them up? who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exercises? and in what also will the teacher instruct them? will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come, take a young man, bring him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief city; it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others; no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and no youth, no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except your own). Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this end, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic<sup>7</sup> art which is the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that which precedes and leads

<sup>7</sup> The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material.

the rest). The duties then are also three : those which are directed towards the existence of a thing ; those which are directed towards its existence in a particular kind ; and third, the chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, τὰ προηγούμενα). What are these? Engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, aversions (ἐκκλίνειν), pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature? Free, noble, modest ; for what other animal blushes? what other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? and we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are conformable to nature.

But I am rich and I want nothing.—Why then do you pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver vessels are enough for you. What need have you of principles (opinions)? But I am also a judge (κριτής) of the Greeks.—Do you know how to judge? Who taught you to know? Caesar wrote to me a codicil.<sup>8</sup> Let him write and give you a commis-

<sup>8</sup> See note 6 at end.

sion to judge of music ; and what will be the use of it to you? Still how did you become a judge? whose hand did you kiss? the hand of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber have you slept?<sup>9</sup> To whom have you sent gifts? Then do you not see that to be a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is? But I can throw into prison any man whom I please.—So you can do with a stone.—But I can beat with sticks whom I please.—So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. Govern us as rational animals ; show us what is profitable to us, and we will follow it ; show us what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like a governor of men, who made them subject to him their desires, their aversion, their movements towards an object and their turning away from it.—Do this : do not do this : if you do not obey, I will throw you into prison.—This is not governing men like rational animals. But I (say), As Zeus has ordained, so act ; if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will be punished.—What will be the punishment? Nothing else than not having done your duty ;

<sup>9</sup> Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you? and he compares i. 19. But Schweighaeuser says that this is not the meaning here, and that the meaning is this : He who before daybreak is waiting at the door of a rich man, whose favour he seeks, is said in a derisive way to be passing the night before a man's chamber.

you will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do not look for greater penalties than these.

## CHAPTER VIII.

HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST  
APPEARANCES (*φαντασίαις*).

**A**S we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances ; for these appearances also propose questions to us. A certain person's son is dead. Answer ; the thing is not within the power of the will : it is not an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of it ? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. Caesar has condemned a person. It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. The man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends on the will : it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. That is a thing within the power of the will : it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress ; for we shall never assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened ? Your son is dead. Nothing more ? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened ? Your ship is

lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has been led to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds from his own opinion. But Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters. Why? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made you magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the power of being evils? because it is in your power to be happy while you are suffering what you suffer? because he has opened the door to you,<sup>1</sup> when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain.

Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you would like to know. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once when I was present, being vexed with his own friends and as if he was suffering something intolerable, said, "I cannot bear it, you are killing me: you will make me such as that man is;" pointing to me.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See i. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Schweighaeuser says that he does not clearly see what Epictetus means; nor do I.



## CHAPTER IX.

TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING  
UP TO ROME ON A SUIT.

WHEN a certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a suit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of his going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied, If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no rule (*θεσπια*) about this. But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you : if you have right opinions (*δύμματα*), you will fare well ; if they are false, you will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For what is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of the Cnossians ? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome ? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and expense.—I must go.—What tells you this ? Your opinion. Then if opinions are the causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect. Have we then all sound opinions, both you and your adversary ? And how do you differ ? But have you sounder opinions than your adversary ? Why ? You think so. And so does he think that his opinions are better ; and so do madmen. This is a

bad criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your opinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are sailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you are not content to stay at home with the honours which you had, but you desire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out if you have any that are bad? Whom have you approached for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me (knowing the fact). When you were a boy, did you examine your own opinions? and did you not then, as you do all things now, do as you did do? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you were deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who then seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man examining and showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you wish me to say to you?—Help me in this matter.—I have no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what purpose then have philosophers theorems? For

this purpose, that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and continue to be conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a small thing?—No; but the greatest.—What then? does it need only a short time? and is it possible to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it.

Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone or a statue: for you saw me, and nothing more. But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn my opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let us examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away; if you have any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher.—Not so, (you say): but this is only a passing spirit, and while we are hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms and spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges?—Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I shall have no land, as you have none; I shall have no silver cups, as you have none, nor fine beasts, as you have none.—In answer to this it is perhaps sufficient to say: I have no need of such things; but if you possess many things, you have need of others: whether you choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of that which you have not:

of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from perturbation. Whether I have a patron<sup>1</sup> or not, what is that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than you: I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me; for this reason, I flatter no man. This is what I possess instead of vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils of gold; but your discourse, your opinions, your assents, your movements (pursuits), your desires, are of earthen ware. But when I have these things conformable to nature, why should I not employ my studies also upon reason? for I have leisure; my mind is not distracted. What shall I do, since I have no distraction? What more suitable to a man have I than this? When you have nothing to do, you are disturbed; you go to the theatre, or you wander about without a purpose. Why should not the philosopher labour to improve his reason? You employ yourself about crystal vessels: I employ myself about the syllogism named the lying:<sup>2</sup> you about myrrhine<sup>3</sup> vessels: I employ myself about the syllogism named the denying (τοῦ ἀποφάσκοντος). To you everything appears small that you

<sup>1</sup> The Roman word "patronus," which at that time had the sense of a protector.

<sup>2</sup> On the syllogism named "lying" (ψευδόμενος) see Epictetus, ii. 17, note 11.

<sup>3</sup> "Murrhina vasa" were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (xxxvii. c. 2) has something about them.

possess : to me all that I have appears great. Your desire is insatiable : mine is satisfied. To (children) who put their hand into a narrow-necked earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this happens : if they fill the hand, they cannot take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of them, and you will draw things out. And do you part with your desires ; do not desire many things, and you will have what you want.

## CHAPTER X.

### IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS.

WHEN the need of each opinion comes, we ought to have it in readiness :<sup>1</sup> on the occasion of breakfast, such opinions as relate to breakfast ; in the bath, those that concern the bath ; in bed, those that concern bed.

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes  
Before each daily action thou hast scann'd ;  
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone ;  
From first to last examine all, and then  
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.<sup>2</sup>

And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may

<sup>1</sup> See M. Antoninus, iii. 13: "As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles (*δόγματα*) ready for the understanding of things divine and human."

<sup>2</sup> These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras. See iv. 6.

utter them aloud, as when we exclaim "Paeon Apollo."<sup>3</sup> Again, in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever; and we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. (A man who has a fever) may say, If I philosophize any longer, may I be hanged; wherever I go, I must take care of the poor body, that a fever may not come.<sup>4</sup> But what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparation against events which may happen? Do you not understand that you are saying something of this kind? "If I shall still prepare myself to bear with patience what happens, may I be hanged." But this is just as if a man after receiving blows should give up the Pancratiun. In the Pancratiun it is in our power to desist and not to receive blows. But in the other matter, if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain? What then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing? It was for this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. God says to you, Give me a proof that you have duly practised athletics,<sup>5</sup> that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber). Then do you show yourself weak when

<sup>3</sup> The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i. 17: "namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant: Apollo Maedice, Apollo Paeon."

<sup>4</sup> This passage is obscure. See Schweighaeuser's note here, and also his note on s. 6.

<sup>5</sup> εἰ νομίμως ἡθλησας. "St. Paul hath made use of this very expression εἰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, 2 Tim. ii. 3."—Mrs. Carter.

the time for action comes? Now is the time for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well; now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power? who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder you from drinking; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: and he will hinder you from eating; but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger well.

But I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose do you follow them? Slave, is it not that you may be happy, that you may be constant? is it not that you may be in a state conformable to nature, and live so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do you read when you are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a fever. But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame God or man; not to be afflicted at that which happens; to expect death well and nobly, to do what must be done: when the physician comes in, not to be frightened at what he says; nor if he says, "You are doing well,"<sup>8</sup> to be overjoyed. For what good has he

<sup>8</sup> See ii. 18.

told you? and when you were in health, what good was that to you? And even if he says, "You are in a bad way," do not despond. For what is it to be ill? is it that you are near the severance of the soul and the body? what harm is there in this? If you are not near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world going to be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the physician? Why do you say, If you please, master, I shall be well?<sup>7</sup> Why do you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or showing his importance)?<sup>8</sup> Do you not value a physician as you do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead? He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this; if he does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals, neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling power. But as to externals how must he act? so far as not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to others, about things which are of no value? For we ought to have these two prin-

<sup>7</sup> Upton compares Matthew viii. 2: "Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean."

<sup>8</sup> Compare M. Antoninus, iv. 48: τὰς ὀφθαλμοῦν . . . συνεδέσθαι.



ciples in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad ; and that we ought not to lead events, but to follow them.<sup>9</sup>—My brother ought not to have behaved thus to me.—No ; but he will see to that ; and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself towards him as I ought. For this is my own business : that belongs to another ; no man can prevent this, the other thing can be hindered.

## CHAPTER XI.

### CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS.

THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law for those who disobey the divine administration.<sup>1</sup> Whoever thinks any other thing to be good except those things which depend on the will, let him envy, let him desire, let him flatter, let him be perturbed ; whoever considers anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him lament, let him weep, let him be unhappy. And yet, though so severely punished, we cannot desist.

<sup>9</sup> To this Stoic precept Horace (*Epist.* i. 1. 19) opposes that of Aristippus :

*Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor.*

Both wisely said, if they are rightly taken. Schweighaeuser, who refers to i. 12.

<sup>1</sup> "As to the divine law, see iii. 24, and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, iv. 4. 21," etc. (Upton).

Remember what the poet<sup>2</sup> says about the stranger :

Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come.

This then may be applied even to a father : I must not, even if a worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily ; for all are from paternal Zeus. And (let the same be said) of a brother, for all are from the Zeus who presides over kindred. And so in the other relations of life we shall find Zeus to be an inspector.

## CHAPTER XII.

### ABOUT EXERCISE.

WE ought not to make our exercises consist in means contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, we who call ourselves philosophers shall not differ at all from jugglers. For it is difficult even to walk on a rope ; and not only difficult, but it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practise walking on a rope, or setting up a palm tree,<sup>1</sup> or embracing statues ? By no means. Every-

<sup>2</sup> The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the *Odyssey*, xiv. v. 55, etc. :

Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come,  
Ill-treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus,  
Strangers and poor.

<sup>1</sup> See note 7 at end.

thing which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice ; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of that which is proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us as a thing to be worked out? To live with desire and aversion (avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And what is this? Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything which you would avoid. Towards this object then exercise (practice) ought to tend. For since it is not possible to have your desire not disappointed and your aversion free from falling into that which you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you must know that if you allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which are not within the power of the will, you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoiding that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads (prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to things which are not within the power of our will, we ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise.

I am rather inclined to pleasure : I will incline to the contrary side <sup>2</sup> above measure for the sake of exercise. I am averse to pain: I will rub and

<sup>2</sup> ἀνὰ τὸν ἄλλο. See the note of Schweighaeuser.

exercise against this the appearances which are presented to me for the purpose of withdrawing my aversion from every such thing. For who is a practitioner in exercise? He who practises not using his desire, and applies his aversion only to things which are within the power of his will, and practises most in the things which are difficult to conquer. For this reason one man must practise himself more against one thing and another against another thing. What then is it to the purpose to set up a palm tree, or to carry about a tent of skins, or a mortar and pestle?<sup>3</sup> Practise, man, if you are irritable, to endure if you are abused, not to be vexed if you are treated with dishonour. Then you will make so much progress that, even if a man strikes you, you will say to yourself, Imagine that you have embraced a statue. Then also exercise yourself to use wine properly, so as not to drink much, for in this also there are men who foolishly practise themselves; but first of all you should abstain from it, and abstain from a young girl, and dainty cakes. Then at last, if occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper time, you will descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself: the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philo-

<sup>3</sup> This was done for the sake of exercise, says Upton; but I don't understand the passage.

sophy. The earthen pitcher, as the saying is, and the rock do not agree.<sup>4</sup>

After the desire and the aversion comes the second topic (matter) of the movements towards action and the withdrawals from it; that you may be obedient to reason, that you do nothing out of season or place, or contrary to any propriety of the kind. The third topic concerns the assents, which is related to the things which are persuasive and attractive. For, as Socrates said, we ought not to live a life without examination,<sup>5</sup> so we ought not to accept an appearance without examination, but we should say, Wait, let me see what you are and whence you come; like the watch at night (who says) Show me the pass (the Roman tessera).<sup>6</sup> Have you the signal from nature which the appearance that may be accepted ought to have? And finally, whatever means are applied to the body by those who exercise it, if they tend in any way towards desire and aversion, they also may be fit means of exercise; but if they are for display, they are the indications of one who has turned himself towards something external, and who is hunting for something else, and who looks for spectators who will say, Oh, the great man! For this reason Apollonius said well, When you intend to exercise yourself for your own advan-

<sup>4</sup> There is a like fable in Aesop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen (Upton).

<sup>5</sup> See i. 26, and iii. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, vi. 36.

tage, and you are thirsty from heat, take in a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out and tell nobody.<sup>7</sup>

## CHAPTER XIII.

WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF  
PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS.

**S**OLITUDE is a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone, he is not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is among numbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are left solitary, though we are often in Rome, though such a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, and sometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this reason, when we travel, then especially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among robbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes us

<sup>7</sup> Schweighaeuser refers to Arrian's Expedition of Alexander (vi. 26) for such an instance of Alexander's abstinence. There was an Apollonius of Tyana, whose life was written by Philostratus; but it may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here.

from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration,<sup>1</sup> and bewails himself saying, Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what some say that he does when he is alone at the conflagration.<sup>2</sup> For they do not understand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because they set out from a certain natural principle, from the natural desire of community and mutual love, and from the pleasure of conversation among men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a manner for this also (being alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil by himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitable to himself, so ought we also to be able to talk with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with the means of passing our time ; to observe the divine administration, and the relation of ourselves to everything else ; to consider how we formerly were affected towards things that happened and how at present ; what are still the things which give us pain ; how these also can be cured and how removed ; if any things

<sup>1</sup> See note 8 at end.

<sup>2</sup> See note 9 at end.

require improvement, to improve them according to reason.

For you see that Caesar appears to furnish us with great peace, that there are no longer enemies nor battle nor great associations of robbers nor of pirates, but we can travel at every hour and sail from east to west. But can Caesar give us security from fever also, can he from shipwreck, from fire, from earthquake, or from lightning? well, I will say, can he give us security against love? He cannot. From sorrow? He cannot. From envy? He cannot. In a word then, he cannot protect us from any of these things. But the doctrine of philosophers promises to give us security (peace) even against these things. And what does it say? Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from everything. When a man has this peace, not proclaimed by Caesar (for how should he be able to proclaim it?), but by God through reason, is he not content when he is alone? when he sees and reflects, Now no evil can happen to me; for me there is no robber, no earthquake, everything is full of peace, full of tranquillity; every way, every city, every meeting, neighbour, companion, is harmless. One person, whose business it is, supplies me with food;<sup>1</sup> another with raiment; another

<sup>1</sup> See iii. 1.



with perceptions and preconceptions (*προλήψεις*). And if he does not supply what is necessary, he (God) gives the signal for retreat, opens the door, and says to you, Go. Go whither? To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements :<sup>4</sup> what there was in you of fire goes to fire ; of earth, to earth ; of air (spirit), to air ; of water to water : no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon, but all is full of gods and daemons. When a man has such things to think on, and sees the sun, the moon and stars, and enjoys earth and sea, he is not solitary nor even helpless. Well then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murder me? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body.

What kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselves worse than children? and what do children do when they are left alone? They take up shells and ashes, and they build something ; then pull it down, and build something else, and so they never want the means of passing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep, because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I then have no shells, no ashes? But children do what they do through want of thought (or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowledge are unhappy.

<sup>4</sup> See note 10 at end.

Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners.<sup>5</sup> You must then bear such things as you are able, but conformably to nature : but not . . . . Practise sometimes a way of living like a person out of health that you may at some time live like a man in health. Abstain from food, drink water, abstain sometimes altogether from desire, in order that you may some time desire consistently with reason ; and if consistently with reason, when you have anything good in you, you will desire well.—Not so ; but we wish to live like wise men immediately and to be useful to men.—Useful how ? what are you doing ? have you been useful to yourself ? But, I suppose, you wish to exhort them ? You exhort them !<sup>6</sup> You wish to be useful to them. Show to them in your own example what kind of men philosophy makes, and don't trifle. When you are eating, do good to those who eat with you ; when you are drinking, to those who are drinking with you ; by yielding to all, giving way, bearing with them, thus do them good, and do not spit on them your phlegm (bad humours).

<sup>5</sup> See note 11 at end.

<sup>6</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note, and the Latin version.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS.

**A**S bad<sup>1</sup> tragic actors cannot sing alone, but in company with many, so some persons cannot walk about alone. Man, if you are anything, both walk alone and talk to yourself, and do not hide yourself in the chorus. Examine a little at last, look around, stir yourself up, that you may know who you are.

When a man drinks water, or does anything for the sake of practice (discipline), whenever there is an opportunity he tells it to all: "I drink water." Is it for this that you drink water, for the purpose of drinking water? Man, if it is good for you to drink, drink; but if not, you are acting ridiculously. But if it is good for you and you do drink, say nothing about it to those who are displeased with water-drinkers. What then, do you wish to please these very men?

Of things that are done some are done with a final purpose (*πρὸς τέλος*), some according to occasion, others with a certain reference to circumstances, others for the purpose of complying with others, and some according to a fixed scheme of life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> All the MSS. have "good" (*καλὰ*), which the critics have properly corrected. As to *καλὰ*, see Schweighauser's note.

<sup>2</sup> This section is not easy to translate.

You must root out of men these two things, arrogance (pride) and distrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that you want nothing (are deficient in nothing); but distrust is the opinion that you cannot be happy when so many circumstances surround you. Arrogance is removed by confutation; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (to know) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek. This search will do you no harm; and in a manner this is philosophizing, to seek how it is possible to employ desire and aversion (*ἐκκαλίσθαι*) without impediment.

I am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular rank. Another says, I have been a tribune, but you have not. If we were horses, would you say, My father was swifter? I have much barley and fodder, or elegant neck ornaments? If then while you were saying this, I said, Be it so: let us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man such as running in a horse, by which it will be known which is superior and inferior? Is there not modesty (*αἰδώς*), fidelity, justice? Show yourself superior in these, that you may be superior as a man. If you tell me that you can kick violently, I also will say to you, that you are proud of that which is the act of an ass.

## CHAPTER XV.

THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUM-  
SPECTION TO EVERYTHING.<sup>1</sup>

**I**N every act consider what precedes and what follows, and then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you will at first begin with spirit, since you have not thought at all of the things which follow; but afterwards, when some consequences have shown themselves, you will basely desist (from that which you have begun). —I wish to conquer at the Olympic games. —[And I too, by the gods; for it is a fine thing.] But consider here what precedes and what follows; and then, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. You must act according to rules, follow strict diet, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed times, in heat, in cold; drink no cold water, nor wine, when there is opportunity of drinking it.<sup>2</sup> In a word, you must surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to a physician. Next, in the contest, you must be covered with sand,<sup>3</sup> sometimes

<sup>1</sup> See note 12 at end.

<sup>2</sup> The commentators refer us to Paul, 1 Cor. c. 9, 25. Compare Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 39:

Versate diu quid ferre recusent,  
Quid valeant humeri.

<sup>3</sup> Wolf thought that the word *sappi/erverts* might mean the

dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity of dust, be scourged with the whip; and after undergoing all this, you must sometimes be conquered. After reckoning all these things, if you have still an inclination, go to the athletic practice. If you do not reckon them, observe you will behave like children who at one time play as wrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So you also do: you are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a gladiator, then a philosopher, then a rhetorician; but with your whole soul you are nothing: like the ape you imitate all that you see; and always one thing after another pleases you, but that which becomes familiar displeases you. For you have never undertaken anything after consideration, nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to a strict examination; but you have undertaken it at hazard and with a cold desire. Thus some persons having seen a philosopher, and having heard one speak like Euphrates<sup>4</sup>—and yet who can speak like him?—wish to be philosophers themselves.

loss of an eye, but other commentators give the word a different meaning.

<sup>4</sup> In place of Euphrates the *Encheiridion* 29 had in the text "Socrates," which name the recent editors of the *Encheiridion* altered to "Euphrates," and correctly. The younger Pliny (*i. Ep. 10*) speaks in high terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher Euphrates, who is mentioned by M. Antoninus (*x. 31*) and by others.

Man, consider first what the matter is (which you propose to do), then your own nature also, what it is able to bear. If you are a wrestler, look at your shoulders, your thighs, your loins ; for different men are naturally formed for different things. Do you think that, if you do (what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that you can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way be angry and out of humour? You must watch, labour, conquer certain desires ; you must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by your slave, laughed at by those who meet you ; in everything you must be in an inferior condition, as to magisterial office, in honours, in courts of justice. When you have considered all these things completely, then, if you think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for these things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquillity. If you have not considered these things, do not approach philosophy : do not act like children, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then a rhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of Caesar. These things are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad ; you must either labour at your own ruling faculty or at external things ; you must either labour at things within or at external things ; that is, you must either occupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar.

A person said to Rufus <sup>6</sup> when Galba was murdered, Is the world now governed by Providence? But Rufus replied, Did I ever incidentally form an argument from Galba that the world is governed by Providence?

## CHAPTER XVI.

THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER  
INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITH MEN.

**I**F a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or drinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either become like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning charcoal will light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the common sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself. For what

<sup>6</sup> Rufus was a philosopher. See i. 1, i. 9. Galba is the emperor Galba, who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 11 or 14, or perhaps to the end of chapter 17.



will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men? Such a person is bad, such a person is good; this was well done, this was done badly. Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition? Is any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which are discordant, and tunes the instrument? such a power as Socrates had, who in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own purpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people.

Why then are they more powerful than you? Because they utter these useless words from their real opinions, but you utter your elegant words only from your lips; for this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is nauseous<sup>1</sup> to listen to your exhortations and your miserable virtue, which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In this way the vulgar have the advantage over you; for every opinion (*δόγμα*) is strong and invincible. Until then the good (*καλὰ*) sentiments (*ἰσχυροί*) are fixed in you, and you shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to be careful in your association with common persons; if you are not, every day like wax in the

<sup>1</sup> The word is *εὐχᾶναι*. See Antoninus, v. 9.

sun there will be melted away whatever you inscribe on your minds in the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from the sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, because ancient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be made of a different habit ; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and say : See such a one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also physicians send those who have lingering diseases to a different country and a different air ; and they do right. Do you also introduce other habits than those which you have ; fix your opinions and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so : you go hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of exercise (ξυστόν), to a circus ; then you come back hither, and again from this place you go to those places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind, How shall I use the appearances presented to me? according to nature, or contrary to nature? how do I answer to them? as I ought, or as I ought not? Do I say to those things which are independent of the will, that they do not concern me? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever to begin to be something.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## ON PROVIDENCE.

WHEN you make any charge against Providence, consider, and you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason.—Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage.—In what?—In money.—Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest: for you will not find it to be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because Philostorgus was fortunate: Would you choose to lie with Sura?<sup>1</sup>—May it never happen, he replied, that this day should come? Why then are you vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells; or how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means as you abominate; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better things to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich?—He admitted this.—Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better thing? Remember then

<sup>1</sup> Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 13).

always and have in readiness the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an advantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior ; and you will never be vexed.

But my wife treats me badly.—Well, if any man asks you what this is, say, my wife treats me badly.—Is there then nothing more? Nothing.—My father gives me nothing—[What is this? my father gives me nothing—Is there nothing else then?—Nothing]<sup>2</sup> : but to say that this is an evil is something which must be added to it externally, and falsely added. For this reason we must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED BY  
ANY NEWS.

WHEN anything shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power of your will. Can any man report to you that you have formed a bad opinion or had a bad desire? By no means. But perhaps he will report that some person is dead. What then is that to you? He may report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that to you? Or that your father

<sup>2</sup> See Schweighauser's note.

is planning something or other. Against whom? Against your will (*ὑποβουλῆς*)? How can he? But is it against your poor body, against your little property? You are quite safe; it is not against you. But the judge declares that you have committed an act of impiety. And did not the judges (*δικασταί*) make the same declaration against Socrates? Does it concern you that the judge has made this declaration? No. Why then do you trouble yourself any longer about it? Your father has a certain duty, and if he shall not fulfil it, he loses the character of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness. Do not wish him to lose anything else on this account. For never does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in another. On the other side, it is your duty to make your defence firmly, modestly, without anger; but if you do not, you also lose the character of a son, of a man of modest behaviour, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free from danger? No; but he also is in equal danger. Why then are you still afraid of his decision? What have you to do with that which is another man's evil? It is your own evil to make a bad defence; be on your guard against this only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another person. A certain person threatens you. Me? No. He blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs. He is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched man.

## CHAPTER XIX.

WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF A COMMON KIND  
OF MAN AND OF A PHILOSOPHER.

THE first difference between a common person (*ιδιωτης*) and a philosopher is this: The common person says, Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for my father.<sup>1</sup> The philosopher, if he shall ever be compelled to say, Woe to me, stops and says, "but for myself." For nothing which is independent of the will can hinder or damage the will, and the will can only hinder or damage itself. If then we ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when we are unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tranquillity except our own opinion, I swear to you by all the gods that we have made progress. But in the present state of affairs we have gone another way from the beginning. For example, while we were still children, the nurse, if we ever stumbled through want of care, did not chide us, but would beat the stone. But what did the stone do? Ought the stone to have moved on account of your child's folly? Again, if we find nothing to eat on coming out of the bath, the paedagogue never checks our appetite, but he flogs the cook. Man, did we

<sup>1</sup> Compare iii. 5.

make you the paedagogue of the cook and not of the child? Correct the child, improve him. In this way even when we are grown up we are like children. For he who is unmusical is a child in music; he who is without letters is a child in learning; he who is untaught, is a child in life.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THAT WE CAN DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM ALL EXTERNAL THINGS.

**I**N the case of appearances which are objects of the vision,<sup>1</sup> nearly all have allowed the good and the evil to be in ourselves, and not in externals. No one gives the name of good to the fact that it is day, nor bad to the fact that it is night, nor the name of the greatest evil to the opinion that three are four. But what do men say? They say that knowledge is good, and that error is bad; so that even in respect to falsehood itself there is a good result, the knowledge that it is falsehood. So it ought to be in life also. Is health a good thing, and is sickness a bad thing? No, man. But what is it? To be healthy, and healthy in a right way, is good; to be healthy in a bad way is bad; so that it is possible to gain advantage even from sickness, I declare. For is it not possible to gain advan-

<sup>1</sup> See note 13 at end.

tage even from death, and is it not possible to gain advantage from mutilation? Do you think that Menoeceus gained little by death?<sup>2</sup> Could a man who says so, gain so much as Menoeceus gained? Come, man, did he not maintain the character of being a lover of his country, a man of great mind, faithful, generous? And if he had continued to live, would he not have lost all these things? would he not have gained the opposite? would he not have gained the name of coward, ignoble, a hater of his country, a man who feared death? Well, do you think that he gained little by dying? I suppose not. But did the father of Admetus<sup>3</sup> gain much by prolonging his life so ignobly and miserably? Did he not die afterwards? Cease, I adjure you by the gods, to admire material things. Cease to make yourselves slaves, first of things, then on account of things slaves of those who are able to give them or take them away.

Can advantage then be derived from these things? From all; and from him who abuses you. Wherein does the man who exercises before the combat profit the athlete? Very greatly.

<sup>2</sup> Menoeceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life, by which he would save his country, as it was declared by an oracle (Cicero, *Tuscul.* i. c. 48). Juvenal (*Sat.* xiv. 238) says—

Quarum Amor in te  
Quantus erat patriae Deciorum in pectore; quantum  
Dilexit Thebas, si Graecia vera, Menoeceus.

Euripides, *Phoenissae*, v. 913.

<sup>3</sup> The father of Admetus was Pheres (Euripides, *Alceste*).



This man becomes my exerciser before the combat ; he exercises me in endurance, in keeping my temper, in mildness. You say, No ; but he who lays hold of my neck and disciplines my loins and shoulders, does me good ; and the exercise master (the aliptes, or oiler) does right when he says : Raise him up with both hands, and the heavier he (*τασινος*) is, so much the more is my advantage.<sup>4</sup> But if a man exercises me in keeping my temper, does he not do me good ?— This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbour bad ? Bad to himself, but good to me ; he exercises my good disposition, my moderation. Is my father bad ? Bad to himself, but to me good. This is the rod of Hermes ; touch with it what you please, as the saying is, and it will be of gold. I say not so ; but bring what you please, and I will make it good.<sup>5</sup> Bring disease, bring death, bring poverty, bring abuse, bring trial on capital charges ; all these things through the rod of Hermes shall be made profitable. What will you do with death ? Why, what else than that

<sup>4</sup> The meaning is not clear, if we follow the original text. Schweighaeuser cannot see the sense "with both hands" in the Greek, nor can I. He also says that in the words *ἀποὺ ὤψε ἀμφοτέρω*, unless some masculine noun is understood which is not expressed, *τασινος* must be referred to the aliptes ; and he translates *ἀμφοτέρω* by "severior."

<sup>5</sup> Mrs. Carter quotes the Epistle to the Romans (viii. 28) : "and we know that all things work together for good to them that love God" ; but she quotes only the first part of the verse and omits the conclusion, "to them who are the called according to his purpose."

it shall do you honour, or that it shall show you, by act through it,<sup>6</sup> what a man is who follows the will of nature? What will you do with disease? I will show its nature, I will be conspicuous in it, I will be firm, I will be happy, I will not flatter the physician, I will not wish to die. What else do you seek? Whatever you shall give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, honoured, a thing which a man shall seek.

You say, No ; but take care that you do not fall sick : it is a bad thing. This is the same as if you should say, Take care that you never receive the impression (appearance) that three are four : that is bad. Man, how is it bad? If I think about it as I ought, how shall it then do me any damage? and shall it not even do me good? If then I think about poverty as I ought to do, about disease, about not having office,<sup>7</sup> is not that enough for me? will it not be an advantage? How then ought I any longer to look to seek evil and good in externals? What happens? these doctrines are maintained here, but no man carries them away home ; but immediately every one is at war with his slave, with his neighbours, with those who have sneered at him, with those who have ridiculed him. Good luck to Lesbius,<sup>8</sup> who daily proves that I know nothing.

<sup>6</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>7</sup> ἀνυψία; see iv. 4, 2 and 23.

<sup>8</sup> Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus. We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, "each of you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Les-

## CHAPTER XXI.

AGAINST THOSE WHO READILY COME TO THE  
PROFESSION OF SOPHISTS.

THEY who have taken up bare theorems (*θεωρήματα*) immediately wish to vomit them forth, as persons whose stomach is diseased do with food. First digest the thing, then do not vomit it up thus; if you do not digest it, the thing becomes truly an emetic, a crude food and unfit to eat. But after digestion show us some change in your ruling faculty, as athletes show in their shoulders by what they have been exercised and what they have eaten; as those who have taken up certain arts show by what they have learned. The carpenter does not come and say, Hear me talk about the carpenter's art; but having undertaken to build a house, he makes it, and proves that he knows the art. You also ought to do something of the kind; eat like a man, drink like a man, dress, marry, beget children, do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable brother, bear with your father, bear with your son, neighbour, companion.<sup>1</sup> Show us these things that we may see that you have in truth learned something from the philosophers. You say, No; but come and hear me read (philosophical) commentaries. Go away, and seek some-

<sup>1</sup> See note 14 at end.

body to vomit them on. (He replies) And indeed I will expound to you the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can : I will explain his text most clearly : I will add also, if I can, the vehemence of Antipater and Archedemus.<sup>2</sup>

Is it then for this that young men shall leave their country and their parents, that they may come to this place, and hear you explain words? Ought they not to return with a capacity to endure, to be active in association with others, free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a provision for the journey of life with which they shall be able to bear well the things that happen and derive honour from them?<sup>3</sup> And how can you give them any of these things which you do not possess? Have you done from the beginning anything else than employ yourself about the resolution of syllogisms, of sophistical arguments (ἀ μεταπρίπτους), and in those which work by questions? But such a man has a school; why should not I also have a school? These things are not done, man, in a careless way, nor just as it may happen; but there must be a (fit) age and life, and God as a guide. You say, No. But no man sails from a port without having sacrificed to the gods and invoked their help; nor do men sow without having called on Demeter; and shall a man who has undertaken

<sup>2</sup> Cicero (*Academ. Prior. ii. 47*) names Antipater and Archidemus (Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also "opiniosissimi homines."

<sup>3</sup> See note 15 at end.

so great a work undertake it safely without the gods? and shall they who undertake this work come to it with success? What else are you doing, man, than divulging the mysteries? You say, There is a temple at Eleusis, and one here also. There is an hierophant at Eleusis,<sup>4</sup> and I also will make an hierophant; there is a herald, and I will establish a herald; there is a torch-bearer at Eleusis, and I also will establish a torch-bearer; there are torches at Eleusis, and I will have torches here. The words are the same: how do the things done here differ from those done there?—Most impious man, is there no difference? These things are done both in due place and in due time; and when accompanied with sacrifice and prayers, when a man is first purified, and when he is disposed in his mind to the thought that he is going to approach sacred rites and ancient rites. In this way the mysteries are useful; in this way we come to the notion that all these things were established by the ancients for the instruction and correction of life.<sup>5</sup> But you publish and divulge them out of time, out of place, without sacrifices, without purity; you have not the garments which the hierophant ought to have, nor the hair, nor the headdress, nor the voice, nor the age; nor have you purified your-

<sup>4</sup> There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica, and solemn mysteries, and an hierophant, or conductor of the ceremonies.

<sup>5</sup> See the note of T. Burnet, *De Fide et Officiis Christianorum*, ed. sec. p. 89.

self as he has ; but you have committed to memory the words only, and you say, Sacred are the words by themselves.<sup>6</sup>

You ought to approach these matters in another way : the thing is great, it is mystical, not a common thing, nor is it given to every man. But not even wisdom<sup>7</sup> perhaps is enough to enable a man to take care of youths ; a man must have also a certain readiness and fitness for this purpose, and a certain quality of body, and above all things he must have God to advise him to occupy this office, as God advised Socrates to occupy the place of one who confutes error, Diogenes the office of royalty and reproof, and the office of teaching precepts. But you open a doctor's shop, though you have nothing except physic ; but where and how they should be applied, you know not nor have you taken any trouble about it. See, that man says, I too have salves for the eyes. Have you also the power of using them ? Do you know both when and how they will do good, and to whom they will do good ? Why then do you act at hazard in things of the greatest importance ? why are you careless ? why do you undertake a thing that is in no way fit for you ? Leave it to those who are able to do it, and to do it well. Do not yourself bring disgrace on philosophy through your

<sup>6</sup> The reader who has an inclination to compare religious forms ancient and modern, may find something in modern practice to which the words of Epictetus are applicable.

<sup>7</sup> See note 16 at end.

own acts, and be not one of those who load it with a bad reputation. But if theorems please you, sit still, and turn them over by yourself; but never say that you are a philosopher, nor allow another to say it; but say, He is mistaken, for neither are my desires different from what they were before, nor is my activity directed to other objects, nor do I assent to other things, nor in the use of appearances have I altered at all from my former condition. This you must think and say about yourself, if you would think as you ought: if not, act at hazard, and do what you are doing; for it becomes you.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### ABOUT CYNISM.

WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he was a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynism, what kind of person a Cynic ought to be and what was the notion (*πρόληψις*) of the thing, We will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure; but I have so much to say to you, that he who without God attempts so great a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed house no man comes forward, and says to himself, I ought to be manager of the house. If he does so, the master turns round, and seeing him insolently giving orders,

drags him forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the world) ; for here also there is a master of the house who orders everything. (He says) You are the sun ; you can by going round make the year and seasons, and make the fruits grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them remit, and warm the bodies of men properly ; go, travel round, and so administer things from the greatest to the least. You are a calf ; when a lion shall appear, do your proper business (*i.e.* run away) ; if you do not, you will suffer. You are a bull ; advance and fight, for this is your business, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead the army against Ilium ; be Agamemnon. You can fight in single combat against Hector ; be Achilles. But if Thersites<sup>1</sup> came forward and claimed the command, he would either not have obtained it, or if he did obtain it, he would have disgraced himself before many witnesses.

Do you also think about the matter carefully ; it is not what it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now, and I shall wear it then ; I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep hard then ; I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff, and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those whom I meet ; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or if he walks about in purple.—If you imagine the thing to be such as

<sup>1</sup> See the description of Thersites in the *Iliad*, ii. 212.



this, keep far away from it ; do not approach it ; it is not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is, and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a great thing you undertake.

In the first place, in the things which relate to yourself, you must not be in any respect like what you do now ; you must not blame God or man ; you must take away desire altogether ; you must transfer avoidance (*ἔκκλισις*) only to the things which are within the power of the will ; you must not feel anger, nor resentment, nor envy, nor pity ; a girl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know that the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber ; if a person comes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of all these things must use modesty as his protection ; if he does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness, and under the open sky. This is his house, his door ; this is the slave before his bedchamber ; this is his darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide anything that he does ; and if he does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man who lives under the open sky, of a free man ; he has begun to fear some external thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses. For where shall he

hide himself and how? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this paedagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? When then a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men? It cannot be; it is impossible.

In the first place, then, you must make your ruling faculty pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the body is nothing to me; the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you say. And whither? can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. But wherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation (*ἑμιλία*) with gods.

Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with this; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men about good and bad things,<sup>2</sup> to show them that they have wandered, and are seeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it is they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes<sup>3</sup> was carried off to Philip after

<sup>2</sup> The office which in our times corresponds to this description of the Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion.

<sup>3</sup> See I. 24, note 3.

the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who are not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances nor confounded.

It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: Men, whither are you hurrying? what are you doing, wretches? like blind people you are wandering up and down; you are going by another road, and have left the true road; you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not believe him. Why do you seek it without?<sup>4</sup> In the body? It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius.<sup>5</sup> In possessions? It is not there. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus; look at those who are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been twice and thrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in these matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled by an

<sup>4</sup> See note 17 at end.

<sup>5</sup> These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Croesus is the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian.

appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very consulships and glory and splendour they think that they are more wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It is not; if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sardapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though he was a better man than Sardapalus and Nero; but while others are snoring, what is he doing?

Much from his head he tore his rooted hair.

*Iliad, x. 15.*

and what does he say himself?

"I am perplexed," he says, "and  
Disturbed I am," and "my heart out of my bosom  
Is leaping."

*Iliad, x. 91.*

Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you and is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, with which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He knows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature, and the nature of evil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and when anything that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Woe to me, for the Hellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and alone neg-

lected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die? Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it make? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is equally an evil. Is anything else then going to happen than the separation of the soul and the body?<sup>8</sup> Nothing. And if the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say), Oh, you who are a king and have the sceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd; for you weep as shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep; and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was your desire in any danger? was your aversion (*ἐκκλισις*)? was your movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No; but the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife?—Shall we be despised then by the Trojans?—What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do you care about them?

In what then is the good, since it is not in

<sup>8</sup> Man then is supposed to consist of a soul and of a body. It may be useful to remember this when we are examining other passages in *Epictetus*.

these things? Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it: for if you chose to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves; nor would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your thoughts into yourselves: observe the preconceptions which you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that which is not impeded. Come, and do you not naturally imagine it to be great, do you not imagine it to be valuable? do you not imagine it to be free from harm? In what material then ought you to seek for that which flows easily, for that which is not impeded? in that which serves or in that which is free? In that which is free. Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout, of ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of every thing which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that anything which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how is a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud? Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then

you see that there is something in you naturally free. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do anything, which of you can do this, unless he has received an impression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No man. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here.

And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you a man to show you that it is possible.<sup>7</sup> Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want? Am I not without sorrow? am I not without fear? Am I not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my desire? or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever blame God or man?<sup>8</sup> did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countenance? And how do I meet with those whom you are afraid of and admire? Do not I treat them like slaves? Who,

<sup>7</sup> See note 18 at end.

<sup>8</sup> See note 19 at end.

when he sees me, does not think that he sees his king and master?

This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this is their purpose. You say No: but their characteristic is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws: the devouring of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing unseasonably all whom they meet, or displaying their shoulder as a fine thing.—Do you see how you are going to undertake so great a business? First take a mirror: look at your shoulders; observe your loins, your thighs. You are going, my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games, no frigid and miserable contest. In the Olympic games a man is not permitted to be conquered only and to take his departure; but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedaemonians or of Nicopolitans: next he must be whipped also if he has entered<sup>9</sup> into the contests rashly: and before being whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much dust.

Reflect more carefully, know thyself,<sup>10</sup> consult the divinity, without God attempt nothing; for if he shall advise you (to do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to become great

<sup>9</sup> The text is *σκη θέλοντα*. Meibomius suggested *σιελόντα* in place of *θέλοντα*; Schweighaeuser appears to prefer *σιελόντα*, and I have translated this word in the version. I think that there is no doubt about the emendation.

<sup>10</sup> See note 20 at end.



or to receive many blows. For this very amusing quality is conjoined to a Cynic : he must be flogged like an ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who flog him, as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all.<sup>11</sup>—You say No ; but if a man flogs you, stand in the public place and call out, “Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace under thy protection?” Let us bring the offender before the proconsul.—But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is a proconsul or what is any other except him who sent the Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus? Does he call upon any other than Zeus? Is he not convinced that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him? Hercules when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think that he was wretched, but without hesitation he attempted to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the sceptre of Diogenes? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers by when he is in a fever, Miserable wretches, will you not stay? but are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or the fight of athletes ; and will you not choose to see the combat between a fever and a man?<sup>12</sup> Would such a man accuse God who sent him down as

<sup>11</sup> See note 21 at end.

<sup>12</sup> Upton quotes Hieronymus lib. ii. adversus Jovianum, where the thing is told in a different way.

if God were treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circumstances, and claimed to be an example to those who were passing by? For what shall he accuse him of? because he maintains a decency of behaviour, because he displays his virtue more conspicuously?<sup>13</sup> Well, and what does he say of poverty, about death, about pain? How did he compare his own happiness with that of the great king (the king of Persia)? or rather he thought that there was no comparison between them. For where there are perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of things which you cannot avoid, and envies and jealousies, how is there a road to happiness there? But where there are corrupt principles, there these things must of necessity be.

When the young man asked, if when a Cynic has fallen sick, and a friend asks him to come to his house and to be taken care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invitation, he replied, And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic's friend?<sup>14</sup> For the man who invites ought to be such another as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reckoned the Cynic's friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic's

<sup>13</sup> I have not translated, because I do not understand, the words *ἐν παντί*. See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>14</sup> This must be the meaning. Meibomius suggested that the true reading is *Κυνεῖ*, and not *Κυνεῖς*; and Schweighaeuser seems to be of the same mind. I have repeated the word Cynic several times to remove all ambiguity in this section.

sceptre and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends to be considered worthy of a Cynic's friendship, as Diogenes was a friend of Antisthenes, as Crates was a friend of Diogenes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and salutes him, that he is the Cynic's friend, and that the Cynic will think him worthy of receiving a Cynic into his house? So that if you please,<sup>15</sup> reflect on this also : rather look round for some convenient dunghill on which you shall bear your fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that you may not be chilled. But you seem to me to wish to go into some man's house and to be well fed there for a time. Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as the life of a Cynic)?

But, said the young man, shall marriage and the procreation of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic?<sup>16</sup> If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies, perhaps no man will readily apply himself to the Cynic practice. For on whose account should he undertake this manner of life? However if we suppose that he does, nothing will prevent him from marrying and begetting children; for his wife will be another like himself, and his father in law another like himself, and his children will be brought up like himself. But in the present state

<sup>15</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note on *ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν*.

<sup>16</sup> The Stoics recommend marriage, the procreation of children, the discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally.

of things which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God,<sup>17</sup> able to go about among men, not tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will not maintain the character of an honourable and good man? and if he observes them he will lose the character of the messenger, and spy and herald of God. For consider that it is his duty to do something towards his father in law, something to the other kinsfolks of his wife, something to his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family, and from providing for their support. And to say nothing of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the child that he may wash it in the bath; wool for his wife when she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a cup: so the furniture of the house is increased. I say nothing of his other occupations, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king, he who devotes himself to the public interests,

The people's guardian and so full of cares.

Homer, *Iliad* ii. 25.

whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly; who quarrels; what family is well administered, what is not;

<sup>17</sup> See note 22 at end.

going about as a physician does and feels pulses? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you have a head-ache, or the gout: he says to one, abstain from food; to another he says, eat; or do not use the bath; to another, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life? is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to send them to the school-master with writing tablets, and styles (for writing).<sup>18</sup> Besides must he not supply them with beds? for they cannot be genuine Cynics as soon as they are born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose the children as soon as they are born than to kill them in this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him.—Yes, but Crates took a wife.—You are speaking of a circumstance which arose from love and of a woman who was another Crates.<sup>19</sup> But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages and those which are free from distractions,<sup>20</sup> and making this inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in this state of the

<sup>18</sup> In the text it is γραφία, τὸ λύριον. It is probable that there should be only one word. Horace (Sat. i. 6. 73) speaks of boys going to school

*Laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.*

<sup>19</sup> The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all advice in marrying Crates and lived with him exactly as he lived. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 96. Upton.

<sup>20</sup> There is some difficulty about ἀσπαρτάων here. Upton proposed to write ἀσπαρτάων, which he explains "that which has nothing peculiar in it."

world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic.

How then shall a man maintain the existence of society? In the name of God, are those men greater benefactors to society who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children,<sup>21</sup> or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do, how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect contrary to their duty? Did they who left little children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died childless? And did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons or Danaus or Aeolus contribute more to the community than Homer? then shall the duty of a general or the business of a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted the condition of childlessness for nothing; and shall not the royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want of children? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes; and do we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in nothing else? For such matters would not have moved us at all nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or beget children. Man, the Cynic is

<sup>21</sup> Schweighaeuser translates *κακὶς* "male grunnieutes": perhaps it means "ugly-faced."

the father of all men ; the men are his sons, the women are his daughters : he so carefully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus.

If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater form of administration than that in which he is engaged? Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike with Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies, nor yet about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about slavery and freedom? When a man has undertaken the administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall engage in the administration of a state? ask me also if he shall govern (hold a magisterial office) : again I will say to you, Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that which he exercises now?

It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a certain habit of body : for if he appears to be consumptive, thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight. For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent

of the things which they admire to be a good man, but he must also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, he says, I am a proof of this, and my own body also is. So Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking, and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal appearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he seems to be a beggar : all persons turn away from him, all are offended with him ; for neither ought he to appear dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men ; but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive.

There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural grace and sharpness ; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fellow, and nothing else ; and he must have these qualities that he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circumstances that may happen. So Diogenes replied to one who said, Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there are gods ? <sup>22</sup> And, how, replied Diogenes, can this be when I think that you are odious to the gods ? On another occasion in reply to Alexander, who stood by him when he was sleeping, and quoted Homer's line (*Iliad*, ii. 24)

A man a councillor should not sleep at night

he answered, when he was half asleep,

The people's guardian and so full of cares.

<sup>22</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vi. 42.



But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than the sun ; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while he himself is entangled in some vice he will reprove others.<sup>23</sup> For see how the matter stands : to these kings and tyrants their guards and arms give the power of reproving some persons, and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though they are themselves bad ; but to a Cynic instead of arms and guards it is conscience (*τὸ συνιδέειν*) which gives this power. When he knows that he has watched and laboured for mankind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer, and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of the gods, as a minister, as a participater of the power of Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny ;<sup>24</sup>

and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be ; why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word to his kinsmen ? For this reason he is neither over curious nor a busybody when he is in this state of mind ; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is looking after his own affairs. If that is

<sup>23</sup> The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must be pure, for otherwise how can he reprove vice ? This is a useful lesson to those whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind.

<sup>24</sup> See ii. 23, note 11.

not so, you may also say that the general is a busybody, when he inspects his soldiers, and examines them and watches them and punishes the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your arm, you rebuke others, I will say to you, Will you not rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have stolen ; what have you to do with the affairs of others ? For who are you ? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of the bees ? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fellow citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones ?

The Cynic also ought to have such power of endurance as to seem insensible to the common sort and a stone : no man reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must be overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior ; and the body is inferior to the many, the weaker to the stronger. He never then descends into such a contest in which he can be overpowered ; but he immediately withdraws from things which belong to others, he claims not the things which are servile. But where there is will and the use of appearances, there you will see how many eyes he has so that you may say, Argus was blind compared with him. Is his assent ever hasty, his movement

(towards an object) rash, does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he would avoid befall him, is his purpose unaccomplished, does he ever find fault, is he ever humiliated, is he ever envious? To these he directs all his attention and energy; but as to everything else he snores supine. All is peace; there is no robber who takes away his will,<sup>25</sup> no tyrant. But what say you as to his body? I say there is. And his possessions? I say there is. And as to magistracies and honours?—What does he care for them?—When then any person would frighten him through them, he says to him, Begone, look for children: masks are formidable to them; but I know that they are made of shell, and they have nothing inside.

About such a matter as this you are deliberating. Therefore, if you please, I urge you in God's name, defer the matter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what Hector says to Andromache, Retire rather, he says, into the house and weave:

War is the work of men,  
Of all indeed, but specially 'tis mine.

Il. vi. 490.

So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.

<sup>25</sup> This is quoted by M. Antoninus, xi. 36.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS FOR THE  
SAKE OF OSTENTATION.<sup>1</sup>

FIRST say to yourself Who you wish to be : then do accordingly what you are doing ; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, rubbing, and exercise : if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different ; if he is a Pentathlete, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things : if a worker in metal, such things. For everything that we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose ; and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this ? We

<sup>1</sup> Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise *de Causis corruptae eloquentiae*. Upton.

must not be like a sheep, though gentle ; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person's mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you : take care first of all that you are not doing this without a purpose ; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised ? Immediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of praise from the many ? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geometrician. Do you then wish to be useful ? in what ? tell us that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received something useful himself ? No, for neither can a man do anything useful in the carpenter's art, unless he is a carpenter ; nor in the shoemaker's art, unless he is a shoemaker.

Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage ? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises ? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise ? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. Well ; do we fulfil their promise ? Tell me the truth ; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when your hearers came together rather

coldly, and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs?<sup>2</sup> Excellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Begone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a certain person contrary to your opinion? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons?—I hope not.—Why then did you praise and flatter him? He is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses.—How is this?—He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think? Do not these very people secretly despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says except this, This man has some need of me? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown? Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading; has he become more modest? has

<sup>2</sup> Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day delighted in.

he been turned to reflect on himself? has he perceived in what a bad state he is? has he cast away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him? He does. A man who will teach him to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect art, much better than Dion.<sup>3</sup> This is altogether another thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations? and even if he did say it, I should say to him, Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, and then speak.

You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others?—To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is nothing; suppose that there were a thousand.—Dion never had so many hearers.—How could he?—And they understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can move even a stone.—See, these are the words of a philosopher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to others; here is a man who

<sup>3</sup> Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden-mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant and some fragments of fifteen more.

has listened to discourses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. "I have often wondered by what arguments."<sup>4</sup> Not so, but "by what argument": this is more exact than that.—What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words: "Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me;" "and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best."<sup>5</sup> Hence who ever heard Socrates say, "I know something and I teach;" but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him; and he would take them and recommend them.—Not so; but as he accompanied them he would say, Hear me to-day discoursing in the house of Quadratus.<sup>6</sup> Why should I hear you? Do you wish to show

<sup>4</sup> These words are the beginning of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i. 1. The small critics disputed whether the text should be *τίς λόγος*, or *τίν λόγος*.

<sup>5</sup> From the *Crito* of Plato, c. 6.

<sup>6</sup> The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we learn from Pliny, *Ep.* viii. 12, and Juvenal, *vii.* 40. Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so; but he would do, as a man might do



me that you put words together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what good will it do you?—But only praise me.—What do you mean by praising?—Say to me, admirable, wonderful.—Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name (*κατηγορία*)<sup>7</sup> of good, what have I to praise in you? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.—What then? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure?—I hope not. For my part, I do not listen even to a lute-player without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear what Socrates says, Nor would it be seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you.<sup>8</sup> Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or to speak, and while he is reading to say, There are not many who can do these things, I swear by all that you value.

Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit? What physician invites a man to be treated by him? Indeed I now

now. He would say on the road: I hope you will come to hear me. I don't find anything in the notes on this passage; but it requires explanation.

<sup>7</sup> *κατηγορία* is one of Aristotle's common terms.

<sup>8</sup> From Plato's *Apology* of Socrates.

hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. I invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of everything except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of invitation ; and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say : If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there supposed that someone had accused him before Rufus : he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's faults.

The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter : one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a headache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their parents

<sup>9</sup> Aulus Gellius, v. 1. Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton.

and their friends and kinsmen and property, that they may say to you, Wonderful ! when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or Cleanthes ?

What then ? is there not the hortatory style ? Who denies it ? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display ? What is the hortatory style ? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about anything than about what they really wish. For they wish the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I entreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation than when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reading or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself ? or when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well : I must no longer do these things ? But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person : He spoke finely about Xerxes ? and another says, No, but about the battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher ?

## CHAPTER XXIV.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A  
DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT  
IN OUR POWER.

LET not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you ; for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault ; for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his own, and other things not as his own : some things subject to hindrance and compulsion and deprivation ; and these things are not a man's own : but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own ; and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own.—But you say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved.—Why did he consider as his own that which belongs to another ? why, when he looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country ? Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you or for what purpose bewail

yourself? Is it that you also have not thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you sit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in the same places.—Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please, and changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regretting their former condition. — Yes, but this happens to them because they are irrational creatures.— Was reason then given to us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and, if any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and clap our hands like children?

Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to them as if they were jugglers: they tell us that this world is one city,<sup>1</sup> and the substance out of which it has been formed is one, and that there must be a certain

<sup>1</sup> See ii. 5.

period, and that some things must give way to others, that some must be dissolved, and others come in their place ; some to remain in the same place, and others to be moved ; and that all things are full of friendship, first of the gods,<sup>2</sup> and then of men who by nature are made to be of one family ; and some must be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who are removed from them ; and man in addition to being by nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this property, not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, sometimes from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who saw

Of many men the states, and learned their ways.<sup>3</sup>

And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world,

Seeing men's lawless deeds and their good rules of law :<sup>4</sup>

casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in Thebes, how many in Argos, how many in Athens ? and how many do you think that he gained by going about ? And he married also,

<sup>2</sup> See iii. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Homer, *Odyssey*, i. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Odyssey*, xvii. 487.

when it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them as orphans ; for he knew that no man is an orphan ; but it is the father who takes care of all men always and continuously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happiness and desire of what is not present to come together. For that which is happy must have all that it desires, must resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have neither thirst nor hunger.—But Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a rock.—Do you attend to Homer and his stories in everything? Or if Ulysses really wept, what was he else than an unhappy man? and what good man is unhappy? In truth, the whole is badly administered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that they may be happy like himself. But these things are not lawful nor right to think of ; and if Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows not who he is? and who knows what he is, if he forgets that things which have been made are perishable, and that it is not possible for one human being to be with another always? To desire then things which are impossible is to have a slavish cha-

racter, and is foolish : it is the part of a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way that he can, by his opinions.

But my mother laments when she does not see me.—Why has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow ; but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power ; and the sorrow of another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can ; but I will not attempt to do it by every means ; for if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the universe ; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God and of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending on the letters of others.—Some person has arrived from Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where you are not?—From Hellas (Greece) someone is come : I hope that there is no harm.—In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, and must you be so even beyond



sea, and by the report of letters? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security?—Well then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from me. —What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love? Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen : that a fever shall overpower one, a robber another, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those who live with us in the world : cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands.

Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man must keep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and it is not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the general complain when

anything more hard than usual is imposed on you, and you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in your power ; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse ; if to run to the head of the ship, refuse ; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to the other sailors? And so it is here also : every man's life is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe the duty of a soldier and do everything at the nod of the general ; if it is possible, divining what his wishes are : for there is no resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean place ; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that such a man must give little time to the affairs of his household, but be often away from home, either as a governor or one who is governed, or discharging some office, or serving in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to be rooted?—Yes, for it is pleasant.—Who says that it is not? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is

pleasant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end? Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language? that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites? Next, while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates? Will you not throw away as far as you can the things belonging to others with which you decorate yourself, though they do not fit you at all? For what else do they desire than to sleep without hindrance and free from compulsion, and when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash the face, then write and read what they choose, and then talk about some trifling matter, being praised by their friends whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and having walked about a little to bathe, and then eat and sleep, such sleep as is the fashion of such men? why need we say how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell your own way of passing the time which you desire, you who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diogenes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that others do), or something else? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves Roman citizens, are severely punished; and should those, who falsely claim so grave and reverend a thing and name, get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the severest punishments from

those who commit the greatest crimes? For what does this law say? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vain-glorious man : <sup>5</sup> let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave ; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity ; <sup>6</sup> and in a word let him be unhappy and lament.

Well then ; do you wish me to pay court to a certain person ? to go to his doors ? <sup>7</sup>—If reason requires this to be done for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the sake of mankind, why should you not go ? You are not ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you want lettuces ; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the rich when you want anything ?—Yes, for I have no awe of a shoemaker.—Don't feel any awe of the rich.—Nor will I flatter the gardener.—And do not flatter the rich.—How then shall I get what I want ?—Do I say to you, go as if you were certain to get what you want ? And do not I only tell you,

<sup>5</sup> This is a denunciation of the hypocrite.

<sup>6</sup> "Pity" perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning.

<sup>7</sup> "What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded ; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter."  
—Mrs. Carter.

"The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. 1) and to visit his house."—Schweighaeuser.

that you may do what is becoming to yourself? Why then should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And further remember that you have gone to the shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power in anything great or noble, though he may sell dear. You go to buy lettuces; they cost an obolus (penny), but not a talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for to the rich man's door.—Well, I will go.—It is worth talking about.—Let it be so; I will talk with him.—But you must also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise.—Away with that, it is a talent's worth; it is not profitable to me, nor to the state, nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils a good citizen and a friend.—But you will seem not to have been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you again forgotten why you went? Know you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right?—What advantage is it then to him to have done right?—And what advantage is it to a man who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought?—The advantage is to have written it.—Is there no reward then?<sup>8</sup>—Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does

<sup>8</sup> See note 23 at end.

it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never cease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?

In Athens did you see no one by going to his house?—I visited any man that I pleased.—Here also be ready to see, and you will see whom you please : only let it be without meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it depends on what is within, on your opinions. When you have learned not to value things which are external and not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of them is your own, but that these things only are your own, to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness? why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and for the places to which you are accustomed? Wait a little, and you will again find these places familiar ; then, if you are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, weep and lament.

How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not reasonable to be mean-spirited, nor to lament yourself, nor to depend on another, nor ever to blame God or man. I entreat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own children? He did; but it was as a free man, as one who remembered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself, nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and others for brethren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be unhappy on account of any person, but to be happy on account of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made us for this end. Well, did Diogenes<sup>9</sup> love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general

<sup>9</sup> The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epictetus from that which we read in common books.

he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was his country, and no particular place; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens; and he would have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of the Perrhaebi.<sup>10</sup> Thus is freedom acquired. For this reason he used to say, Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have not been a slave. How did Antisthenes make him free? Hear what he says: Antisthenes taught me what is my own, and what is not my own; possessions are not my own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor places familiar, nor mode of life; all these belong to others. What then is your own? The use of appearances. This he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and from compulsion; no person can put an obstacle in my way, no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than I wish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king? How have they this power?

<sup>10</sup> A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country.



For if a man is going to be overpowered by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life, whose slave can he still be? But if he dwelt with pleasure in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his affairs would have been at every man's command ; the stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How do you think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that some time he might see that beautiful Piræus, and the Long Walls, and the Acropolis? In what condition would you see them? As a captive, a slave and mean : and what would be the use of it for you?—Not so : but I should see them as a free man.—Show me how you would be free. Observe, some person has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed place of abode and says, You are my slave, for it is in my power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my power to treat you gently, and to humble you when I choose ; on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to Athens. What do you say to him who treats you as a slave? What means have you of finding one who will rescue you from slavery? Or cannot you even look him in the face, but without saying more do you entreat to be set free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison,

hastening, going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in Hellas (Greece)? And when you must die, will you then also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion? Have you gone abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to find some person from whom you might receive benefit? What benefit? That you may solve syllogisms more readily, or handle hypothetical arguments? and for this reason did you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you might return when you had learned these things? So you did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor freedom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may maintain your relative position without impediment? This is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms and sophistical arguments and hypothetical: if you like, take your place in the agora (market or public place) and proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic. Will you not deny even all that you have learned that you may not bring a bad name on your theorems as useless? What harm has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured you that you should prove by your acts that his labours are useless? Were the evils that you had there (at home) not enough, those which

were the cause of your pain and lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad? Have you added more to the list? And if you again have other acquaintances and friends, you will have more causes for lamentation ; and the same also if you take an affection for another country. Why then do you live to surround yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which you are unhappy? Then, I ask you, do you call this affection? What affection, man? If it is a good thing, it is the cause of no evil ; if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it. I am formed by nature for my own good ; I am not formed for my own evil.

What then is the discipline for this purpose? First of all, the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it were at the entrance, is this : when you are delighted with anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not one of those which cannot be taken away, but as with something of such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it has been broken you may remember what it was, and may not be troubled. So in this matter also : if you kiss your own child, or your brother or friend, never give full licence to the appearance (*παρρησία*), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses ; but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them that they are mortal.<sup>11</sup> Do you also remind

<sup>11</sup> It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand

yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love is nothing of your own: it has been given to you for the present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but as the fig is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter.<sup>12</sup> For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from the universe to the things which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping voice, To-morrow you will die; and to a friend also, To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again?—But these are words of bad omen.—And some incantations also are of bad omen; but because they are useful, I don't care for this; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are significant of some evil? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and grief, and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen;

behind the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41.

<sup>12</sup> Compare Antoninus xi. 33 and 34.

and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen? say that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a former state into other states; not a destruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going away from home and a small change; such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.<sup>13</sup>—Shall I then no longer exist?—You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need;<sup>14</sup> for you also came into existence, not when you chose, but when the world had need of you.

Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regularity, and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to exist (live)? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in nature, as thou hast wished me to exist; for thou hast made me free from hindrance

<sup>13</sup> Marcus Antoninus, xi. 35. Compare Epict., iii. 13, 14, and iv. 7, 75.

<sup>14</sup> See note 24 at end.

in that which is my own. But hast thou no further need of me? I thank thee; and so far I have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost thou depart? Again, I say, as thou hast pleased, as free, as thy servant, as one who has known thy commands and thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service, whom dost thou will me to be? A prince or a private man, a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a teacher or a master of a family? whatever place and position thou mayst assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost thou will me to be? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara. Only remember me there where I am. If thou sendest me to a place where there are no means for men living according to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to thee, but as if thou wast giving me the signal to retreat: I do not leave thee; let this be far from my intention, but I perceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living according to nature be allowed to me, I will seek no other place than that in which I am, or other men than those among whom I am.

Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day; these you should write, these you should read; about these you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, Can you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if anything

that is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will immediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing in all cases to say, I knew that I begot a son who is mortal.<sup>15</sup> For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave my home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwith recollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of the power of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is it to me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is it that sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of the state. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in everything. Then, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your power to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquer it; do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how many pleasures there were for him who lived there, and how many there would be for him who returned to Rome; but fix your mind on this matter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara

<sup>15</sup> Seneca de Consol. ad Pol. c. 30; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 13.

like a man of courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the life in Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome.

Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being conscious that you are obeying God ; that not in word, but in deed, you are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the rest may say in solemn manner in the schools, and may be judged to be saying in a way contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing ; and they are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring about me and praising me ; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldier such as he ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the things which are independent of the will. See that you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire : seek not the good in things external ; seek it in yourselves : if you do not, you will not find it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at another time sends me thither ; shows me to men as poor, without authority, and sick ; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hates me, far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his servants ? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect any even of the smallest



things;<sup>16</sup> but he does this for the purpose of exercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Being appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which I am, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands?

Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want of one to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be without something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or attendants on Caesar? Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who have received so great authority from Zeus? Only do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it; but show it by your acts; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy.

<sup>16</sup> Compare i. 12, ii. 14, iii. 26. "Compare this with the description of the universal care of Providence, Matthew x. 29, 30, and the occasion on which it was produced."—*Mrs. Carter.*

## CHAPTER XXV.

TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (DESIST) FROM  
THEIR PURPOSE.

CONSIDER as to the things which you proposed to yourself at first, which you have secured, and which you have not ; and how you are pleased when you recall to memory the one, and are pained about the other ; and if it is possible, recover the things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we are engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows. For the combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancration, in which both the successful and the unsuccessful may have the greatest merit, or may have little, and in truth may be very fortunate or very unfortunate ; but the combat is for good fortune and happiness themselves. Well then, even if we have renounced the contest in this matter (for good fortune and happiness), no man hinders us from renewing the combat again, and we are not compelled to wait for another four years that the games at Olympia may come again ; but as soon as you have recovered and restored yourself, and employ the same zeal, you may renew the combat again ; and if again you renounce it, you may again renew it ; and if you once gain the victory, you are like him who has never

renounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing the same thing (renouncing the combat) begin to do it with pleasure, and then like a bad athlete go about after being conquered in all the circuit of the games like quails who have run away.<sup>1</sup>

The sight of a beautiful young girl overpowers me. Well, have I not been overpowered before? An inclination arises in me to find fault with a person; for have I not found fault with him before? You speak to us as if you had come off (from these things) free from harm, just as if a man should say to his physician who forbids him to bathe, Have I not bathed before? If then the physician can say to him, Well, and what then happened to you after the bath? Had you not a fever, had you not a headache? And when you found fault with a person lately, did you not do the act of a malignant person, of a trifling babbler; did you not cherish this habit in you by adding to it the corresponding acts? And when you were overpowered by the young girl, did you come off unharmed? Why then do you talk of what you did before? You ought, I

<sup>1</sup> "All the circuit of the games" means the circuit of the Pythian, Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympic games. A man who had contended in these four games victoriously was named *Periodonices*, or *Periodeutes* (Upton).

The Greeks used to put quails in a cockpit, as those who are old enough may remember that we used to put gamecocks to fight with one another. Schweighaeuser describes a way of trying the courage of these quails from Pollux (ix. 109); but I suppose that the birds fought also with one another.

think, remembering what you did, as slaves remember the blows which they have received, to abstain from the same faults. But the one case is not like the other; for in the case of slaves the pain causes the remembrance: but in the case of your faults, what is the pain, what is the punishment; for when have you been accustomed to fly from evil acts?<sup>2</sup> Sufferings then of the trying character are useful to us, whether we choose or not.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT.<sup>1</sup>

**A**RE you not ashamed at being more cowardly and more mean than fugitive slaves? How do they when they run away leave their masters? on what estates do they depend, and what domestics do they rely on? Do they not after stealing a little which is enough for the first days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea, contriving one method after another for maintaining their lives?

<sup>2</sup> See note 25 at end.

<sup>1</sup> "Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of our Saviour on the same subject, Matthew vi. 25-34; Luke xii. 22-30."—Mrs. Carter. The first verse of Matthew begins, "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink," etc. No Christian literally follows the advice of this and the following verses, and he would be condemned by the judgment of all men if he did.

And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger?<sup>2</sup> But you are afraid lest necessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don't you see the road to which the want of necessities leads?—Well, where does it lead?—To the same place to which a fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not often said this yourself to your companions? have you not read much of this kind, and written much? and how often have you boasted that you were easy as to death?

Yes; but my wife and children also suffer hunger.<sup>3</sup>—Well then, does their hunger lead to any other place? Is there not the same descent to some place for them also? Is there not the same state below for them? Do you not choose then to look to that place full of boldness against every want and deficiency, to that place to which both the richest and those who have held the highest offices, and kings themselves and tyrants must descend? or to which you will descend hungry, if it should so happen, but they burst by indigestion and drunkenness. What beggar did you hardly ever see who was not an old man, and even of extreme old age? But chilled with cold day and night, and lying on the ground, and eating only what is absolutely necessary they approach near to the impossibility of

<sup>2</sup> It is very absurd to suppose that no fugitive slave ever died of hunger. How could Epictetus know that?

<sup>3</sup> See note 26 at end.

dying.<sup>4</sup> Cannot you write? Cannot you teach (take care of) children? Cannot you be a watchman at another person's door?—But it is shameful to come to such a necessity.—Learn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tell us that you are a philosopher; but at present do not, even if any other man call you so, allow it.

Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you are not the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a headache, as a fever? If your parents were poor, and left their property to others, and if, while they live, they do not help you at all, is this shameful to you? Is this what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never hear that the thing which is shameful ought to be blamed, and that which is blameable is worthy of blame? Whom do you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not do himself? Did you then make your father such as he is, or is it in your power to improve him? Is this power given to you? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them? And have

<sup>4</sup> We see many old beggars who endure what others could not endure; but they all die at last, and would have died earlier if their beggar life had begun sooner. The living in the open air and wandering about help them to last longer; but the exposure to cold and wet and to the want of food hastens their end. The life of a poor old beggar is neither so long nor so comfortable as that of a man who has a good home and sufficient food, and lives with moderation.

you also been accustomed while you were studying philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from yourself? Lament then, and groan and eat with fear that you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaves lest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die. So live, and continue to live, you who in name only have approached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable to those who take them up; you who have never sought constancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions; you who have not sought any person for the sake of this object, but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who have never thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself. Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear? What remains for me to do? But as if all your affairs were well and secure, you have been resting on the third topic,<sup>6</sup> that of things being unchanged, in order that you may possess unchanged—what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance (*ἑκκλισις*) which fails in the attempt? About security in these things you have been anxious.

Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and then to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see building a battlement all round and not

<sup>6</sup> See iii. c. 2.

encircling it with a wall?<sup>6</sup> And what door-keeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in order to be able to prove—what? You practise that you may not be tossed as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Show me first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me the scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on measuring the dust?<sup>7</sup> Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the universe? Show me these. “See, I show them: I will resolve syllogisms for you.”—This is the measure, slave; but it is not the thing measured. Therefore you are now paying the penalty for what you neglected, philosophy: you tremble, you lie awake, you advise with all persons; and if your deliberations are not likely to please all, you think that you have deliberated ill. Then you fear hunger, as you suppose; but it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you will not have a cook, that you will not have another to purchase provisions for the table, a

<sup>6</sup> “Plato using the same simile teaches that last of all disciplines dialectic ought to be learned.”—Schweighaeuser.

<sup>7</sup> This is good advice. When you propose to measure, to estimate things, you should first tell us what the things are before you attempt to fix their value; and what is the measure or scales that you use.



third to take off your shoes, a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, and to follow you, in order that in the bath, when you have taken off your clothes and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified, you may be rubbed on this side and on that, and then the aliptes (rubber) may say (to the slave), Change his position, present the side, take hold of his head, show the shoulder; and then when you have left the bath and gone home, you may call out, Does no one bring something to eat? And then, Take away the tables, sponge them: you are afraid of this, that you may not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those who are in health, how slaves live, how labourers, how those live who are genuine philosophers; how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes,<sup>8</sup> who attended to the school and drew water. If you choose to have these things, you will have them everywhere, and you will live in full confidence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not subject to hindrance, in that which cannot be taken away, that is, in your own will. And why have you made yourself so useless and good for nothing

<sup>8</sup> Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno in his school, was a great example of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties; during the night he used to draw water from the wells for the use of the gardens; during the day he employed himself in his studies. He was the author of a noble hymn to Zeus, which is extant.

that no man will choose to receive you into his house, no man to take care of you? but if a utensil entire and useful were cast abroad, every man who found it would take it up and think it a gain; but no man will take you up, and every man will consider you a loss. So cannot you discharge the office even of a dog, or of a cock? Why then do you choose to live any longer, when you are what you are?

Does any good man fear that he shall fail to have food? To the blind it does not fail, to the lame it does not: shall it fail to a good man? And to a good soldier there does not fail to be one who gives him pay, nor to a labourer, nor to a shoemaker: and to the good man shall there be wanting such a person?<sup>9</sup> Does God thus neglect the things that he has established, his ministers, his witnesses, whom alone he employs as examples to the uninstructed, both that he exists, and administers well the whole, and does not neglect human affairs, and that to a good man there is no evil either when he is living or when he is dead? What then when he does not supply him with food? What else does he do than like a good general he has given me the signal to retreat? I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising his acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also

<sup>9</sup> It seems strange that Epictetus should make such assertions when we know that they are not true. Shortly after he himself speaks even of the good man not being supplied with food by God.

go away when it pleases him ; and while I lived, it was my duty to praise God both by myself, and to each person severally and to many. He does not supply me with many things, nor with abundance, he does not will me to live luxuriously ; for neither did he supply Hercules who was his own son ; but another (Eurystheus) was king of Argos and Mycenae, and Hercules obeyed orders, and laboured, and was exercised. And Eurystheus was what he was, neither king of Argos nor of Mycenae, for he was not even king of himself ; but Hercules was ruler and leader of the whole earth and sea, who purged away lawlessness, and introduced justice and holiness ;<sup>10</sup> and he did these things both naked and alone. And when Ulysses was cast out shipwrecked, did want humiliate him, did it break his spirit ? but how did he go off to the virgins to ask for necessaries, to beg which is considered most shameful ?<sup>11</sup>

As a lion bred in the mountains trusting in his strength.

Od. vi. 130.

Relying on what ? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on

<sup>10</sup> " Compare Hebrews xi. and xii., in which the Apostle and Philosopher reason in nearly the same manner and even use the same terms ; but how superior is the example urged by the Apostle to Hercules and Ulysses !"—Mrs. Carter.

<sup>11</sup> The story of Ulysses asking Nausicaa and her maids for help when he was cast naked on the land is in the *Odyssey*, vi. 127.

his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things which are in our power and those which are not. For these are the only things which make men free, which make them escape from hindrance, which raise the head (neck) of those who are depressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich and on tyrants. And this was (is) the gift given to the philosopher. But you will not come forth bold, but trembling about your trifling garments and silver vessels. Unhappy man, have you thus wasted your time till now?

What, then, if I shall be sick? You will be sick in such a way as you ought to be.—Who will take care of me?—God; your friends.—I shall lie down on a hard bed.—But you will lie down like a man.—I shall not have a convenient chamber.—You will be sick in an inconvenient chamber.—Who will provide for me the necessary food?—Those who provide for others also. You will be sick like Manes.<sup>12</sup>—And what also will be the end of the sickness? Any other than death?—Do you then consider that this the chief of all evils to man and the chief mark of mean spirit and of cowardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Against this fear then

<sup>12</sup> Manes is a slave's name. Diogenes had a slave named Manes, his only slave, who ran away, and though Diogenes was informed where the slave was, he did not think it worth while to have him brought back. He said, it would be a shame if Manes could live without Diogenes, and Diogenes could not live without Manes.

I advise you to exercise yourself : to this let all your reasoning tend, your exercises, and reading ; and you will know that thus only are men made free.





## BOOK IV.

### CHAPTER I.

#### ABOUT FREEDOM.

**H**E is free who lives as he wishes to live ;<sup>1</sup> who is neither subject to compulsion, nor to hindrance, nor to force ; whose movements to action (ὁρμαί) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid (ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes ; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, Paradox. v., "Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur," etc.

would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free.<sup>2</sup>

If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free, I whom no man can purchase? I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it.

And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with

<sup>2</sup> “‘Whoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin,’ John viii. 34.”—Mrs. Carter.

being a slave? It is something, you say; but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all; but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar,<sup>3</sup> we are free.

However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar's feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go out by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend what you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A usual form of oath. See ii. 20. 29. Upton compares the Roman expression, "*Per Genium*," as in Horace, *Epp.* i. 7. 94 —

*Quod te per Genium, dextramque, Deosque Penates  
Obsecro et obtestor.*

<sup>4</sup> A lover's exclusion by his mistress was a common topic, and a serious cause of complaint (*Lucretius*, iv. 1172):



But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides <sup>5</sup> says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword, and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and entreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear?

Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? <sup>6</sup> Is it not the fact that the more he lives

At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe  
Floribus et sertis operit.

See also Horace, Odes, i. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Thrasonides was a character in one of Menander's plays, entitled *Μισούμενος*, or the Hated.

<sup>6</sup> It must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion; but we read of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epp. 41.

at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? <sup>7</sup> and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content; and he writes to the Persian king, You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the

<sup>7</sup> The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common among the Romans. Ovid (*Amor.* ii. 6) has written a beautiful elegy on the death of a favourite parrot.

preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it?

The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths?<sup>8</sup> No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, someone with whom he shall sup; then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed

<sup>8</sup> See ii. 1. The *εικοστώναι* were the Publicani, men who farmed this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when manumitted was established at an early time (Livy, vii. 16). It appears from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his savings (*peculium*). See ii. 1, note 7.

me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness ; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings,<sup>9</sup> then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of ; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon)<sup>10</sup> to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions (*προλήψεις*) to the several things which are.<sup>11</sup> For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to

<sup>9</sup> A gold ring was worn by the Equites ; and accordingly to desire the gold ring is the same as to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class.

<sup>10</sup> The colophon. See ii. 14, note 5. After the words “most splendid slavery” it is probable that some words have accidentally been omitted in the MSS.

<sup>11</sup> Compare i. 2, note 2.

adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick ; not so, however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor ; another that he has a severe father or mother ; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against ? One preconception is not repugnant to another,<sup>12</sup> only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful and a thing to be avoided ? He answers, not to be Caesar's friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter ; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar's friend, nevertheless he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks ? To live secure, to be happy, to do everything as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance ? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy ? Of whom shall we inquire ? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very

<sup>12</sup> Compare i. 22.

man who is become Caesar's friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar's friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me : you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me ; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth : then come troubles and cares.—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained ; and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do anything foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of ; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect anything so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar's friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar.

Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find ; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to dis-

cover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property; for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so.

Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible.—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also.—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self-governing?—

Certainly.—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold ; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, “Master,” even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, “Wretch that I am, how much I suffer,” call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a *praetexta*.<sup>13</sup> If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune ; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia ;<sup>14</sup> say that his master is from home ; he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return ? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away. Thus then have we many masters ? We have ; for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters ; and

<sup>13</sup> Sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores.—Juv. ii. 170.

See Epict. i. 2, note 4.

<sup>14</sup> Saturnalia. See i. 25, note 3.

At this season the slaves had liberty to enjoy themselves and to talk freely with their masters. Hence Horace says, Sat. ii. 74—

Age, libertate Decembri,  
Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere.



these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor, or consul. When we love, and hate, and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume (*ἰσχυρότατον*) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false.

What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way; but

examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No.—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No.—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then : whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?—When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power.—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.—When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this.—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.<sup>15</sup>—Your body then is another's, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself?—It is.—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No.—And your slaves?—No.—And your clothes?—No.—And your house?—No.—And your horses?—Not one of these things.—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power.

Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only

<sup>15</sup> Schweighaeuser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics taught ; and Epictetus often tells us that the door is open. He suggests that the true reading may be καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν. I think that the text is right. Epictetus asks is "Life or death" in our power. He means no more than if he had said Life only.

and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of the kind?—I know not.—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false?<sup>16</sup>—No man.—In the matter of assent then<sup>17</sup> you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted.—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No.—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act.—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing; or is it not so?—It is my own act.—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act.—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me.—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No; but my poor body.—Yes, as he would do with a stone.—Granted; but I no longer walk.—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move; but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also.—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man.—And

<sup>16</sup> He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22.

<sup>17</sup> See note 27 at end.

to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you? He cannot do this; but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire anything which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way.—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance?

Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor anything else that belongs to another; for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire<sup>18</sup> anything not your own, to everything that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of everything which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press,<sup>19</sup> and a soldier

<sup>18</sup> The word "admire" is θαυμάζεις in the original. The word is often used by Epictetus, and Horace uses "admirari" in this Stoical sense. See i. 29, note 2.

<sup>19</sup> The word is ἀγρῆσις, a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, viii. 98). It means here the seizure of animals for military pur-

should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur ; if you do, you will receive blows, and nevertheless you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes,<sup>20</sup> barley, fodder. Let these also go : get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass.

When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself ; do you still fear any man ? No one. For about what will you be afraid ? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil ? and who has power over these things ? who can take them away ? who can impede them ? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your

poses when it is necessary. Upton refers to Matthew v. 41, Mark xv. 21, for similar uses of the verb ἀγγαρεύω.

<sup>20</sup> Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the word (ὀροθυμία) in Epictetus is "ferreæ calces." I suppose they could use nothing but iron.

possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire; but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty.

When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis

(a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant's) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action (*ἔργον*) in obedience to God.<sup>21</sup> Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards anything? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my wish also.<sup>22</sup> Does he not will? I do not wish. Is

<sup>21</sup> See note 28 at end.

<sup>22</sup> In this passage the distinction must be observed between

it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die; it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus.

Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world <sup>23</sup> the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow-companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar; when I am Caesar's companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how

ἀίλω and βούλομαι, which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Mrs. Carter.

<sup>23</sup> ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ: he means "on earth."



many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar's friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstances becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow-traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety.

How do you understand "attaching yourself to God?" In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements (*ῥημάς*, the acts) of God<sup>24</sup> and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will (*τὰ προαιρετικά*); he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole (*τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ*)<sup>25</sup> possessions, household things, house, children,

<sup>24</sup> Schweighaeuser expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word (*ῥημάς*) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it "*Dei appetitionem*," and Upton "*impetum*." He says that he has translated it "*consilium*."

It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man.

<sup>25</sup> See ii. 1. 18. Schweighaeuser expected that Epictetus

wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away.<sup>26</sup> Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?—My father gave them to me.—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship?

Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow-workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the

would have said "body and possessions, etc." I assume that Epictetus did say "body and possessions, etc.," and that his pupil or some copyist of MSS. has omitted the word "body."

<sup>26</sup> "'The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away.' Job i. 21."—Mrs. Carter.

festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation;<sup>27</sup> and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife.—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart.<sup>28</sup> He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those

<sup>27</sup> The initiated (*μύσται*) are those who were introduced with solemn ceremonies into some great religious body. These ceremonies are described by Dion Prus. *Orat. xii.*, quoted by Upton.

<sup>28</sup> See note 29 at end.

who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly, he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly (*πανηγυρις*) ; for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions ; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things?—To use them.—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary ; do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary.

This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land ; then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you ; and say. while you are daily exercising yourself as you do

there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom ; for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason, when he was taken prisoner,<sup>29</sup> how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no ; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master?<sup>30</sup> Immediately he disputed with him, and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner ; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and so if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what

<sup>29</sup> See iii. 24, ii. 13.

<sup>30</sup> See the same story in Aulus Gellius (ii. c. 18), who says that Xenias, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the master of his children.

else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power; and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man's nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly.

Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius<sup>31</sup> at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?—The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and

<sup>31</sup> See i. 2, note 5.

been severely wounded ; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt : nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating,<sup>32</sup> when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in everything is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing ? Is this a paradox ? for do you not say this in the case of all other things ? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently ? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox ? It is not.—What then, is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded ? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit ? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper, or wasp ?

Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be ; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free

<sup>32</sup> I do not know if dogs sweat ; at least in a state of health I have never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science.

from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner.<sup>33</sup> Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul—

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O destiny,  
The way that I am bid by you to go.<sup>34</sup>

But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me.—Let me consider.—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul)

<sup>33</sup> As Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of the Stoics.

<sup>34</sup> Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, c. 52. M. Antoninus, *Gatak*, 2d. ed. 1697. Annot. p. 96.



acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this inquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those

other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools; and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher;<sup>35</sup> thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money; thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions.<sup>36</sup> You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say

<sup>35</sup> Stoicus occidit Baream, delator anicum,  
Discipulumque senex.

Juvenal, iii. 116.

Epictetus is supposed to allude to the crime of Egnatius Celer, who accused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 32).

<sup>36</sup> Mrs. Carter says that "there is much obscurity and some variety of reading in several lines of the original." But see Schweighauser's notes. Epictetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless; philosophy should be practical.

something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads.

And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—Who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countenance; you who court old women<sup>87</sup> and old men, and say, I cannot do this; it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla<sup>88</sup> has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any-one to assert your freedom (*καρπιστήν*), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed, when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider

<sup>87</sup> Horace, Sat. ii. 5.

<sup>88</sup> Aprulla is a Roman woman's name. It means some old woman who is courted for her money.

him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power.<sup>39</sup> But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women's noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion,<sup>40</sup> and endure his arrogance and servile insolence; for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride.

You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire.<sup>41</sup> But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was

<sup>39</sup> See note 30 at end.

<sup>40</sup> Felicion. See i. 19.

<sup>41</sup> Epictetus alludes to his lameness: compare i. 8, i. 16, and other passages (Upton).

born of free parents,<sup>42</sup> but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it ; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg ; if of all his body, all his poor body ; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that everything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes : " For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians,

<sup>42</sup> Schweighaeuser doubts if the words *οὐ γὰρ ἴν*, which I have omitted, are genuine, and gives his reasons for the doubt.

as you please." Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law<sup>43</sup> is everything to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free.

And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly;<sup>44</sup> and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon,

<sup>43</sup> The sense of "law" (*ὁ νόμος*) can be collected from what follows. Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law (*Criton*, c. 11, etc.).

<sup>44</sup> Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium. He is said to have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common (*Plato's Apology*).

ping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying?<sup>49</sup> or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive.<sup>50</sup>

Think of these things, these opinions, these words; look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished; and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging, and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a

<sup>49</sup> The original is ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἦτι ἴμενον ἰκάνοι; this seems to mean, if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have been to whom we might have been useful? They would have been left behind, and we could have done nothing for them.

<sup>50</sup> See note 31 at end.

consul ; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar's residence), you will no less be a slave ; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them ; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination (*φαντασία*), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them ; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present ; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these ; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free ; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man ; be seen about a philosopher's doors : you will not disgrace yourself by being seen ; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least ; the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.



## CHAPTER II.

## ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY.

TO this matter before all you must attend, that you be never so closely connected with any of your former intimates or friends as to come down to the same acts as he does.<sup>1</sup> If you do not observe this rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises in your mind, "I shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have the same feeling towards me," remember that nothing is done without cost, nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to be the same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have, to be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the same with your former self; or being superior, not to obtain from your friends the same that you did before. For if this is better, immediately turn away to it, and let not other considerations draw you in a different direction. For no man is able to make progress (improvement) when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose

<sup>1</sup> He means that you must not do as he does, because he does this or that act. The advice is in substance, Do not do as your friend does simply because he is your friend.

to attend to this only, to work out this only, give up everything else. But if you will not do this, your wavering will produce both these results : you will neither improve as you ought, nor will you obtain what you formerly obtained. For before, by plainly desiring the things which were worth nothing, you pleased your associates. But you cannot excel in both kinds, and it is necessary that so far as you share in the one, you must fall short in the other. You cannot, when you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, be agreeable to them as you were before. Choose then whether you will be a hard drinker and pleasant to your former associates, or a sober man and disagreeable to them. You cannot, when you do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, be equally loved by them. Choose then in this matter also which of the two you will have. For if it is better to be modest and orderly than for a man to say, *He is a jolly fellow*, give up the rest, renounce it, turn away from it, have nothing to do with such men. But if this behaviour shall not please you, turn altogether to the opposite ; become a catamite, an adulterer, and act accordingly, and you will get what you wish. And jump up in the theatre and bawl out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different cannot be mingled ; you cannot act both *Thersites* and *Agamemnon*. If you intend to be *Thersites*,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See *Iliad*, ii. 216 ; and for the description of *Agamemnon*, *Iliad*, iii. 167.

you must be humpbacked and bald ; if Agamemnon, you must be tall and handsome, and love those who are placed in obedience to you.

### CHAPTER III.

#### WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS.

**K**EEP this thought in readiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place of it ; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss ; neither if you have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you have acquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always maintain your character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste them all and overturn them. And it needs only a few things for the loss and overturning of all, namely, a small deviation from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no need of the same means as he has need of for saving it ; but if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost ; and if he does not do this purposely, but has been neglecting his duty a

little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case also : if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have up to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances of things, and watch over them ; for that which you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a word liberty. For what will you sell these things ? See what is the value of the things which you will obtain in exchange for these.— But shall I not obtain any such thing for it ?— See, and if you do in return get that, see what you receive in place of it.<sup>1</sup> I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : he possesses a praetorship, I possess modesty. But I do not make acclamations where it is not becoming ; I will not stand up where I ought not ;<sup>2</sup> for I am free, and a friend of God, and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) anything else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good report, nor in fact anything. For he (God) does not allow me to claim (seek) them ; for if he had chosen, he would have made them good for me ; but he has not done so, and for this reason I cannot transgress his commands.<sup>3</sup> Preserve that which is your own good in everything ; and as to every other

<sup>1</sup> The text is obscure, and perhaps there is something wrong.

<sup>2</sup> He alludes to the factions in the theatres, iii. 4, iv. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See i. 25, note 1 ; iv. 7.

thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave consistently with reason in respect to them, content with this only. If you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in all things, you will be hindered, you will be impeded. These are the laws which have been sent from thence (from God); these are the orders. Of these laws a man ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius and Cassius.<sup>4</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN TRANQUILLITY.

REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For, to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the difference between desiring power or being

<sup>4</sup> Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Persius, v. 90). C. Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a descendant of the Cassius who was one of the murderers of the dictator C. Caesar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Vespasian.

content with a private station ; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading ? For as salutations and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read ? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labour.<sup>1</sup> But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life (*eὐνοια*) ? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it ? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.—And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something : I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep,<sup>2</sup> of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external ;<sup>3</sup> and then that I may attend to men, what they say,

<sup>1</sup> See note 32 at end.

<sup>2</sup> "Sed veræ numerosque modosque ediscere vitæ" (Hor. Epp. ii. 2. 144 ; M. Antoninus, iii. 1).

<sup>3</sup> See note 33 at end.

how they are moved ;<sup>4</sup> and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule ; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them ? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not ; thanks to God.

Come, when you have done these things and have attended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many ? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading ? are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise ? Why then do you not act consistently in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach any person ? If you maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady ; if you look rather after the things which are done and happen than are looked at yourself ; if you do not envy those who are preferred before you ; if surrounding circumstances (*ἑλαι*) do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want ? Books ? How or for what purpose ? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life ? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this ? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the

<sup>4</sup> Compare Horace, Sat. i. 4. 133 : " Neque enim cum lectulus," etc.

stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise ; for this purpose were used the halteres (weights),<sup>5</sup> the dust, the young men as antagonists ; and do you seek for those things now when it is time for action ? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about comprehension (*κατάληψις*).

What then is the reason of this ? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearances presented to us ; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism,<sup>6</sup> and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason, where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power ? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action (efforts,

<sup>5</sup> See i. 4, note 5. The athletes were oiled, but they used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay hold of one another.

<sup>6</sup> M. Antoninus, i. 17, thanks the gods that he did not waste his time in the resolution of syllogisms.



ὁρμῇ),<sup>7</sup> not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well ; if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid ; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another), we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations ; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon, To-day I have read so many verses, I have written so many ; but (we should say), To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers ; I have not employed my desire ; I have used avoidance (ἐκκλίσει) only with respect to things which are within the power of my will ; I have not been afraid of such a person ; I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another ; I have exercised my patience,<sup>8</sup> my abstinence, my co-operation with others ; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him.

But now we do not know that we also in another way are like the many. Another man

<sup>7</sup> See iii. c. 2.

<sup>8</sup> See Aulus Gellius, xvii. 19, where he quotes Epictetus on what Gellius expresses by "intolerantia" and "incontinentia." Compare M. Antoninus (v. 33) on the precept Ἀνίχου and Ἀνίχου.

is afraid that he shall not have power ; you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man ; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates did, If so it pleases God, so let it be ? Do you think that Socrates, if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served in military expeditions so often as he did ; and would he not have lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am ; I must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum ? Why, was this your business, to sun yourself ? And is it not your business to be happy, to be free from hindrance, free from impediment ? And could he still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way ? how would he still have been able to write paeans in his prison ? <sup>9</sup>

In short, remember this, that what you shall prize which is beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition ; not only occupation (business), but also leisure.—Now then must I live in this tumult ?—Why do you

<sup>9</sup> Plato in the *Phaedon* (c. 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a hymn to Apollo.

say tumult?—I mean among many men.—Well, what is the hardship? Suppose that you are at Olympia ; imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, another is doing another thing, and a third is pushing another person ; in the baths there is a crowd ; and who of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens. — Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp ; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure ; it is a desert : I do not like a crowd ; it is confusion.—But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought ; talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to you), work up your preconceptions.<sup>10</sup> If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival ; try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen ; we are delighted when we see many ships ; who is pained when he sees many men?—But they deafen me with their cries.—Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered? And who prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it, and

movement towards a thing and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this?

Do you only bear in mind the general rules : what is mine, what is not mine ; what is given (permitted) to me ; what does God will that I should do now? what does he not will? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says to you : Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators.—But my wish is to live quietly.—Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word, to be disappointed and to be unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things?—And how shall I release myself?—Have you not often heard that you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turning away) to those things

only which are within your power, that you ought to give up everything, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private station? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness,

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, necessity.<sup>11</sup>

Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. To Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhappy; and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things.—Athens is a good place. But happiness is much better; and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation.<sup>12</sup> But happiness is an

<sup>11</sup> Compare *Encheiridion*, 52. Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, who also wrote some poetry. See iii. 26, note 8.

<sup>12</sup> He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the morning at the houses of the great and powerful at Rome. Upton refers to Virgil, *Georgics*, ii. 461.

equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick? But if you do not so, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius.<sup>13</sup>

There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night : the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune ; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so ; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered ; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes ; and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl ;<sup>14</sup> nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a

<sup>13</sup> Compare i. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Compare Horace, Sat. i. 5. 83.

lover of labour ; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power (*ηγέμονικόν*), that he may keep it in a state conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); for these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season.<sup>15</sup> If you see anything which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling ; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness ; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province ? These things come to you from your-

<sup>15</sup> See Antoninus, vi. 2 ; and ix. 6, "Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything which happens—that is enough."

self and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on?

## CHAPTER V.

AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS.

THE wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's *Symposium*<sup>1</sup> how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son<sup>2</sup> who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not that this or

<sup>1</sup> See ii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> See Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, ii. 2.



that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing which belongs to another ; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own, to the end that others also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (*praetor*)<sup>3</sup> of an army? No ; but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No ; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to belong to another : and to be instructed is this, to learn what things are a man's own and what belongs to another.

How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at anything which happens, and does it appear new to him?<sup>4</sup> Does he not expect that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme

<sup>3</sup> The word *ἐπαρχή* may be translated either way.

<sup>4</sup> See iv. 1, note 18, on the use of *καυχή*.

wickedness? Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in what school that man is a tame<sup>5</sup> animal, that men love one another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones. Have you then done anything wrong? But the things in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free power of will.<sup>6</sup> What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your store-house, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of his natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot run. When is a dog wretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he

<sup>5</sup> See ii. 10, iv. 1. So Plato says (*Legg.* vi.), that a man who has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of animals (*Upton*).

<sup>6</sup> See iii. 1.

cannot strangle lions or embrace statues,<sup>7</sup> for he did not come into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into which he has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been born or has died,<sup>8</sup> but because it has happened to him in his lifetime to have lost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his father, not his land and house, and his inn,<sup>9</sup> and his slaves; for not one of these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are servile and subject to account (*ἐκτιμήματα*), at different times given to different persons by those who have them in their power; but I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this sestertius?<sup>10</sup> The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away; it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit.<sup>11</sup> So also in this case: What is

<sup>7</sup> Like Hercules and Diogenes. See iii. 12.

<sup>8</sup> See note 34 at end.

<sup>9</sup> The word is *νομότατον*, which Schweighaeuser says that he does not understand. He supposes the word to be corrupt; unless we take it to mean the inn in which a man lives who has no home. I do not understand the word here.

<sup>10</sup> See the note of Schweighaeuser on the word *σέστυριον* in the text.

<sup>11</sup> See note 35 at end.

the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept them; I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man? Is everything judged (determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say that the form in wax<sup>12</sup> is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an apple. But the external figure is not enough; neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know when he is refuted: he is an ass; in another man the sense of shame is become dead: he is good for nothing, he is anything rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.

What then? would you have me to be despised? —By whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to you?

<sup>12</sup> He says τὸ κέρονον, which Mrs. Carter translates "a piece of wax." Perhaps it means "a piece of wax in the form of an apple."

For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art.—But they will be more hostile to me <sup>13</sup> for this reason.—Why do you say “me”? Can any man injure you, will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way can he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show yourself afraid? <sup>14</sup> And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no access to the things which are mine.

In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers, (and say) : What trouble these men are now taking for nothing ; our wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable ; but nothing else than his opinions makes a man’s soul impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what honour (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man’s opinions)? All (other) things

<sup>13</sup> The word is *ἐκφύγονται*, the form of which is not Greek. Schweighaeuser has no remark on it, and he translates the word by “adorientur.” The form ought to be *ἐκφύγονται*. Probably the word is corrupted.

<sup>14</sup> Mrs. Carter renders *φοβέσθαι* by “formidable,” and in the Latin translation it is rendered “formidabilem,” but that cannot be the meaning of the word here.

everywhere are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable and servile and to labour at the things which are imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each thing is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made Eteocles and Polynices<sup>15</sup> enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, and the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; <sup>16</sup> to consider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a

<sup>15</sup> Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate Oedipus, who quarrelled about the kingship of Thebes and killed one another. This quarrel is the subject of the *Seven against Thebes* of Aeschylus and the *Phoenissae* of Euripides. See ii. 22, note 3.

<sup>16</sup> "Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good."—Bp. Butler, *Analogy*, chap. 2. The Bishop's "naturally" is the *φύσις* of Epictetus.

brother, or a son, or a father. For nothing is more akin to us than the good ; therefore if these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of enemies, treacherous men and sycophants. But if the will (*προαίρεσις*, the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be is the only good ; and if the will being such as it ought not to be is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling ? about what ? about the things which do not concern us ? and strife with whom ? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things ?

Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful ?) son.<sup>17</sup> For in what did she show her bad temper ? In pouring water on his head as much as she liked, and in trampling on the cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if I think that these things are nothing to me ? But this is my business ; and neither tyrant shall check my will nor a master ; nor shall the many check me who am only one, nor shall the stronger check me who am the weaker ; for this power of being free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every man. For these opinions make love in a house (family), concord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to God ; they make a man in all things

<sup>17</sup> See note 36 at end.

cheerful (confident) in externals as about things which belong to others, as about things which are of no value.<sup>18</sup> We indeed are able to write and to read these things, and to praise them when they are read, but we do not even come near to being convinced of them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedaemonians, "Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes," will fit in our case also, "Lions in the school, but out of it foxes."<sup>19</sup>

## CHAPTER VI.

### AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED.

I AM grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to stop this pity?—It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require pity.—And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition?—I think that I am not; but these persons do not pity me for

<sup>18</sup> This is one of the wisest and noblest expressions of Epictetus.

<sup>19</sup> See Aristophanes, *The Peace*, v. 1188:

πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ μ' ἠδίκησαν,  
ὅντας οἱ μὲν λέοντες,  
ἐν μέλλ' δ' ἀλώμενες. Upton



the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults ; but they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honourable offices, for diseases and deaths and other such things.—Whether then are you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office (*ἀνάρχοντι*) and enjoys no honour to be happy ; or to show yourself to them as rich and in power ? For the second of these things belongs to a man who is boastful, silly, and good for nothing. And consider by what means the pretence must be supported. It will be necessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad.<sup>1</sup> Is this power

<sup>1</sup> See note 37 at end.

given to you? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnest about doing,<sup>2</sup> to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others? For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it?—It is a thing independent of the will.—Then is it nothing to you?—It is nothing.—When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil?

Will you not then letting others alone be to yourself both scholar and teacher?—The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature; but to me no man is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning

<sup>2</sup> Something is perhaps wrong in the text here.

of this, that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am no way made easier (more content)? Am I so stupid? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid; but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen (as the things which are rational): and now I read about these things, hear about them, write about them; I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me? And yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra, nor in writing or reading, am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also. But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor do I practice in these the proper practice (study). Then I care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy.—

Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things (*ἐν τοῖς ἐκκλίνειν*), in your movements (purposes, *ἐν ὁρμαῖς*), in your preparation (for anything), in your designs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity you?—Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be.—Are you then pained at this? and is he who is pained an object of pity?—Yes.—How then are you pitied not as you ought to be? For by the very act that you feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? “It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill spoken of.”<sup>3</sup> My head is sound, and all think that I have the headache. What do I care for that? I am free from fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever, (and say,) Poor man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have fever. I also say with a sorrowful countenance, In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then? As God may please; and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the same being done in this case also? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my poverty? I am

<sup>3</sup> M. Antoninus, vii. 36

not in power (not a magistrate), but others are ; and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them look to it who pity me ;<sup>4</sup> but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold ; but because they are hungry or thirsty they think that I am too. What then shall I do for them ? Shall I go about and proclaim and say, Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than right opinions. These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing at all.—What foolish talk is this ? How do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be ?

But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me.—What then is more reasonable than for those who have laboured about anything to have more in that thing in which they have laboured ? They have laboured for power, you have laboured about opinions ; and they have laboured for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they have more than you in this about which you have laboured, and which they neglect ; if they assent better than you with respect to the natural rules (measures) of things ; if they are less disappointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less into things which they would avoid than you do ; if in their

<sup>4</sup> ἰσχυραί. See i. 4, note 4.

intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they take a better aim ; if they better observe a proper behaviour, as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names by which we express the relations of life. But if they exercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they do all? But it is most unreasonable that he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who does not look after it.

Not so ; but since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power.—Yes, in the matter about which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case is just the same as if, because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about opinions and employ yourself about the things which you wish to acquire ; and then lament, if you do not succeed ; for you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are looking after other things ; but the many say this truly, that one act has no community with another.<sup>5</sup> He who has risen in the morning seeks whom

<sup>5</sup> See note 38 at end.

(of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to whom he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall please the dancing man, how by bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays, he prays about these things; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things; the saying of Pythagoras—

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes <sup>6</sup>—

he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Anything like a free man, anything like a noble-minded man? And if he finds anything of the kind, he blames and accuses himself: "Why did you say this? Was it not in your power to lie? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from telling a lie." But do you, if indeed you have cared about nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning reflect, "What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects), and free from perturbation? What am I? Am I a poor body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is said? I am none of these. But what am I? I am a rational animal. What then is required

<sup>6</sup> See iii. 1, note 2. Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See Schweighaeuser's remarks on the words, "He who has risen, etc." I have of necessity translated κακοηθισμένος in an active sense; but if this is right, I do not understand how the word is used so.

of me?" Reflect on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness (*εὐνοίαν*)? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done?

So great then being the difference in desires, actions, wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not laboured, and they have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have; but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were really convinced that, with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR.

**W**HAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber, and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then, if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is



with his guards, is he not afraid? or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose, because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man, neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body, and also about his children and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him, or what guards or what swords?

Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit,<sup>1</sup> and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from

<sup>1</sup> See note 39 at end.

demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal, man, has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this, being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason, if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God<sup>2</sup> for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in

<sup>2</sup> "This agrees with Eph. v. 20: 'Giving thanks always for all things to God.'"—Mrs. Carter. The words are the same in both, except that the Apostle has εὐχαριστεῖτε, and Epictetus has χάριν ἔχον.

externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears ; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him ; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.

What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting everything which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened ? Would you have me to bear poverty ? Come, and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power ? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment ? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me ; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me ; for neither can any man deprive me of them ; but my opinions alone are mine, and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die ? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is ; it is now time for the matter (of

the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe?<sup>3</sup> what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others, but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches.

Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber?<sup>4</sup> Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits

<sup>3</sup> He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is composed; none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, will go to him who gave it (iii. 13, note 4). But I do not suppose that he means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness.

<sup>4</sup> See i. 19, note 6.

me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless someone allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose.<sup>5</sup> I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will (*συνθέλω*). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar's chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts; the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed; let children look to that. Money is

<sup>5</sup> " 'Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt,' Matthew xxvi. 39."—Mrs. Carter. "Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good."—Bp. Butler, Sermon on the Love of God.

distributed ; let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed ; let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves ; but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then ? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled ; if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it ; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor anything else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good.

Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do ? They kill. And what does a fever do ? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile ? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them ? I hope that this will not happen ; but when I have once learned that everything which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it, or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker.

When then I neither fear anything which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire anything which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do anything foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon<sup>6</sup> of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off.—Does the tyrant's head always remain where it is, or the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied.—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards<sup>7</sup> he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he

<sup>6</sup> See iv. 1, note 45.

<sup>7</sup> I do not see the meaning of ὕστερον: it may perhaps mean "after leaving the school." See Schweighaeuser's note.

is not flesh nor bones nor sinews (*νεῦρα*), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs them and follows (understands) the appearances of things.<sup>8</sup>

Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws. —And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law.<sup>9</sup> And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you; on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones,<sup>10</sup> how your

<sup>8</sup> Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor what he supposes it to be. "Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with."—Butler's Analogy, chap. i.

<sup>9</sup> See note 40 at end.

<sup>10</sup> The word is *λιθοστρώταις*, which means what we name Mosaic



slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute-players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things; attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty<sup>11</sup> (*ἡγεμονικόν*); consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.

floors or pavements. The word *λιόστρωτον* is used by John, xix. 13, and rendered in our version by "pavement."

<sup>11</sup> See note 41 at end.

## CHAPTER VIII.

AGAINST THOSE WHO HASTILY RUSH INTO THE  
USE OF THE PHILOSOPHIC DRESS.

NEVER praise nor blame a man because of the things which are common (to all, or to most), and do not ascribe to him any skill or want of skill ; and thus you will be free from rashness and from malevolence. This man bathes very quickly. Does he then do wrong ? Certainly not. But what does he do ? He bathes very quickly. Are all things then done well ? By no means ; but the acts which proceed from right opinions are done well ; and those which proceed from bad opinions are done ill. But do you, until you know the opinion from which a man does each thing, neither praise nor blame the act. But the opinion is not easily discovered from the external things (acts). This man is a carpenter. Why ? Because he uses an axe. What then is this to the matter ? This man is a musician because he sings. And what does that signify ? This man is a philosopher because he wears a cloak and long hair. And what does a juggler wear ? For this reason if a man sees any philosopher acting indecently, immediately he says, See what the philosopher is doing ; but he ought because of the man's indecent behaviour rather

to say that he is not a philosopher. For if this is the preconceived notion (*πρόληψις*) of a philosopher and what he professes, to wear a cloak and long hair, men would say well ; but if what he professes is this rather, to keep himself free from faults, why do we not rather, because he does not make good his professions, take from him the name of philosopher? For so we do in the case of all other arts. When a man sees another handling an axe badly, he does not say, What is the use of the carpenter's art? See how badly carpenters do their work ; but he says just the contrary, This man is not a carpenter, for he uses an axe badly. In the same way, if a man hears another singing badly, he does not say, See how musicians sing ; but rather, This man is not a musician. But it is in the matter of philosophy only that people do this. When they see a man acting contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title, but they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts deriving the fact that he is behaving indecently, they conclude that there is no use in philosophy.

What then is the reason of this? Because we attach value to the notion (*πρόληψιν*) of a carpenter, and to that of a musician, and to the notion of other artisans in like manner, but not to that of a philosopher, and we judge from externals only that it is a thing confused and ill-defined. And what other kind of art has a name from the dress and the hair ; and has not both theorems

and a material and an end? What then is the material (matter) of the philosopher? Is it a cloak? No, but reason. What is his end? is it to wear a cloak? No, but to possess the reason in a right state. Of what kind are his theorems? Are they those about the way in which the beard becomes great or the hair long? No, but rather what Zeno says, to know the elements of reason, what kind of a thing each of them is, and how they are fitted to one another, and what things are consequent upon them. Will you not then see first if he does what he professes when he acts in an unbecoming manner, and then blame his study (pursuit)? But now when you yourself are acting in a sober way, you say in consequence of what he seems to you to be doing wrong, Look at the philosopher, as if it were proper to call by the name of philosopher one who does these things; and further, This is the conduct of a philosopher. But you do not say, Look at the carpenter, when you know that a carpenter is an adulterer or you see him to be a glutton; nor do you say, See the musician. Thus to a certain degree even you perceive (understand) the profession of a philosopher, but you fall away from the notion, and you are confused through want of care.

But even the philosophers themselves as they are called pursue the thing (philosophy) by beginning with things common to them and others; as soon as they have assumed a cloak and grown a beard, they say, I am a philoso-

pher.<sup>1</sup> But no man will say, I am a musician, if he has bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute; nor will he say, I am a smith, if he has put on a cap and apron. But the dress is fitted to the art; and they take their name from the art, and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates<sup>2</sup> used to say well, A long time I strove to be a philosopher without people knowing it; and this, he said, was useful to me: for first I knew that when I did anything well, I did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but for the sake of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself; I had my countenance well composed and my walk: all for myself and for God. Then, as I struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger: in no respect through me, if I did anything base or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered; nor did I injure the many by doing anything wrong as a philosopher. For this reason those who did not know my purpose used to wonder how it was that while I conversed and lived altogether with all philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself. And what was the harm for me to be known to be a philosopher by my acts and not by outward marks?<sup>3</sup> See

<sup>1</sup> Compare Horace, Ep. i. 19, 12, etc.:

Quid si quis vultu torvo ferus et pede nudo  
Exiguæque togæ simulet textore Catonem,  
Virtutemne repræsentet moresque Catonis?

<sup>2</sup> See iii. 15, note 4.

<sup>3</sup> "Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my

how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear and forbear, how I co-operate, how I employ desire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), how I maintain the relations (to things), those which are natural or those which are acquired, how free from confusion, how free from hindrance. Judge of me from this, if you can. But if you are so deaf and blind that you cannot conceive even Hephaestus<sup>4</sup> to be a good smith unless you see the cap on his head, what is the harm in not being recognized by so foolish a judge?

So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most persons; and they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers. Was he vexed then as we are, and did he say, And do you not think that I am a philosopher? No, but he would take them and introduce them, being satisfied with one thing, with being a philosopher; and being pleased also with not being thought to be a philosopher, he was not annoyed; for he thought of his own occupation. What is the work of an honourable and good man? To have many pupils? By no means. They will look to this matter who are earnest about it. But was it his business to examine carefully difficult theorems? Others will look after these

faith by my works" (Epistle of James, ii. 18). So a moral philosopher may say, I show my principles, not by what I profess, but by that which I do.

<sup>4</sup> See the statues of Hephaestus, Montfaucon, *Antiq.* vol. i. lib. iii. c. 1 (Upton).

shoulder bare, they quarrel with those whom they meet ; and if they see a man in a thick winter coat,<sup>7</sup> they quarrel with him. Man, first exercise yourself in winter weather : see your movements (inclinations) that they are not those of a man with a bad stomach or those of a longing woman. First strive that it be not known what you are : be a philosopher to yourself (or philosophize to yourself) a short time. Fruit grows thus : the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the ear before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a produce of the garden of Adonis.<sup>8</sup> Such a poor plant are you also : you have blossomed too soon ; the cold weather will scorch you up. See what the husbandmen say about seeds when there is warm weather too early. They are afraid lest the seeds should be too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay hold of them and show that they are too forward. Do you also consider, my man ; you have shot out too soon, you have hurried towards a little fame before the proper season ; you think that you are something, a fool among fools ; you will be caught by the frost, and rather you have been frost-bitten in

<sup>7</sup> The word is *φανόλη*, which seems to be the Latin "*paenula*."

<sup>8</sup> "The gardens of Adonis" are things growing in earthen vessels, carried about for show only, not for use. "The gardens of Adonis" is a proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for instance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Such things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonia.

the root below, but your upper parts still blossom a little, and for this reason you think that you are still alive and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the natural way : why do you bare (expose) us ? why do you force us ? we are not yet able to bear the air. Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then the second, then the third ; in this way the fruit will naturally force itself out, even if I do not choose. For who that is pregnant and filled with such great principles does not also perceive his own powers and move towards the corresponding acts ? A bull is not ignorant of his own nature and his powers when a wild beast shows itself, nor does he wait for one to urge him on ; nor a dog when he sees a wild animal. But if I have the powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to prepare me for my own (proper) acts ? At present I have them not, believe me. Why then do you wish me to be withered up before the time, as you have been withered up ?



## CHAPTER IX.

TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO  
A CHARACTER OF SHAMELESSNESS.<sup>1</sup>

WHEN you see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set against this the fact that you have not the want (desire) of power ; when you see another rich, see what you possess in place of riches ; for if you possess nothing in place of them, you are miserable ; but if you have not the want of riches, know that you possess more than this man possesses and what is worth much more. Another man possesses a handsome woman (wife) ; you have the satisfaction of not desiring a handsome wife. Do these things appear to you to be small ? And how much would these persons give, these very men who are rich, and in possession of power, and live with handsome women, to be able to despise riches and power and these very women whom they love and enjoy ? Do you not know then what is the thirst of a man who has a fever ? He possesses that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man who is in health ; for the man who is in health ceases to be thirsty after he has

<sup>1</sup> "They who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in reading this chapter of Epictetus."—Mrs. Carter.

drunk ; but the sick man being pleased for a short time has a nausea, he converts the drink into bile, vomits, is griped, and more thirsty. It is such a thing to have desire of riches and to possess riches, desire of power and to possess power, desire of a beautiful woman and to sleep with her ; to this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the thing which you love, indecent words, indecent thoughts, unseemly acts.

And what do I lose ? you will say. My man, you were modest, and you are so no longer. Have you lost nothing ? In place of Chrysippus and Zeno you read Aristides and Evenus ;<sup>2</sup> have you lost nothing ? In place of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who is able to corrupt and seduce most women. You wish to appear handsome and try to make yourself so, though you are not. You like to display splendid clothes that you may attract women ; and if you find any fine oil (for the hair),<sup>3</sup> you imagine that you are happy. But formerly you did not think of any such thing, but only where there should be

<sup>2</sup> Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the author of a work named *Milesiaca* or *Milesian stories*. All that we know of the work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious. It was translated into Latin by L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of the Dictator Sulla ; and it is mentioned by Plutarch (*Life of Crassus*, c. 32), and several times by Ovid (*Tristia*, ii. 413, etc.). Evenus was perhaps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture from being here associated with Aristides what his character was.

<sup>3</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note on the word *μυραλοφίον*, which he has in his text. It should be *μυραλοφίον*, if the word exists.

decent talk, a worthy man, and a generous conception. Therefore you slept like a man, walked forth like a man, wore a manly dress, and used to talk in a way becoming a good man ; then do you say to me, I have lost nothing ? So do men lose nothing more than coin ? Is not modesty lost ? Is not decent behaviour lost ? Is it that he who has lost these things has sustained no loss ? Perhaps you think that not one of these things is a loss. But there was a time when you reckoned this the only loss and damage, and you were anxious that no man should disturb you from these (good) words and actions.

Observe, you are disturbed from these good words and actions by nobody, but by yourself. Fight with yourself, restore yourself to decency, to modesty, to liberty. If any man ever told you this about me, that a person forces me to be an adulterer, to wear such a dress as yours, to perfume myself with oils, would you not have gone and with your own hand have killed the man who thus calumniated me ? Now will you not help yourself ? and how much easier is this help ? There is no need to kill any man, nor to put him in chains, nor to treat him with contumely, nor to enter the Forum (go to the courts of law), but it is only necessary for you to speak to yourself, who will be most easily persuaded, with whom no man has more power of persuasion than yourself. First of all, condemn what you are doing, and then when you have condemned it, do not despair of yourself, and be not in the

condition of those men of mean spirit, who, when they have once given in, surrender themselves completely and are carried away as if by a torrent. But see what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they say, wrestle again till you are made strong. Do you also do something of the same kind; for be well assured that nothing is more tractable than the human soul. You must exercise the Will,<sup>4</sup> and the thing is done, it is set right; as on the other hand, only fall a nodding (be careless), and the thing is lost; for from within comes ruin and from within comes help. Then (you say) what good do I gain? And what greater good do you seek than this?<sup>5</sup> From a shameless man you will become a modest man, from a disorderly you will become an orderly man, from a faithless you will become a faithful man, from a man of unbridled habits a sober man. If you seek anything more than this, go on doing what you are doing; not even a God can now help you.

<sup>4</sup> The original is *ἐκλήσκει δειν*. Seneca (Ep. 80): "Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? Velle." Upton.

The power of the Will is a fundamental principle with Epictetus. The will is strong in some, but very feeble in others; and sometimes, as experience seems to show, it is incapable of resisting the power of old habits.

<sup>5</sup> See note 42 at end.

## CHAPTER X.

WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE, AND  
WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO VALUE.

THE difficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness is about externals. What shall I do, how will it be, how will it turn out, will this happen, will that? All these are the words of those who are turning themselves to things which are not within the power of the will. For who says, How shall I not assent to that which is false? how shall I not turn away from the truth? If a man be of such a good disposition as to be anxious about these things, I will remind him of this, Why are you anxious? The thing is in your own power : be assured : do not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the natural rule. On the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy) about desire, lest it fail in its purpose and miss its end, and with respect to the avoidance of things, lest he should fall into that which he would avoid, I will first kiss (love) him, because he throws away the things about which others are in a flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs his thoughts about his own affairs and his own condition. Then I shall say to him, If you do not choose to desire that which you will fail to obtain, nor to attempt

to avoid that into which you will fall, desire nothing which belongs to (which is in the power of) others, nor try to avoid any of the things which are not in your power. If you do not observe this rule, you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall into that which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here? where is there room for the words, *How will it be?* and *How will it turn out?* and *Will this happen or that?*

Now is not that which will happen independent of the will? Yes. And the nature of good and of evil is it not in the things which are within the power of the will? Yes. Is it in your power then to treat according to nature everything which happens? Can any person hinder you? No man. No longer then say to me, *How will it be?* For however it may be, you will dispose of it well,<sup>1</sup> and the result to you will be a fortunate one. What would Hercules have been if he said, *How shall a great lion not appear to me, or a great boar, or savage men?* And what do you care for that? If a great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight; if bad men appear, you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I lose my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble act. For since we must certainly die, of necessity a man must be found doing something, either following the employment of a husbandman, or

<sup>1</sup> See note 43 at end.

digging, or trading, or serving in a consulship, or suffering from indigestion or from diarrhœa. What then do you wish to be doing when you are found by death? I for my part would wish to be found doing something which belongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the general interest, noble. But if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would be found doing at least that which I cannot be hindered from doing, that which is permitted me to do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty which makes use of appearances, labouring at freedom from the affects (labouring at tranquillity of mind), rendering to the relations of life their due; if I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touching on (advancing to) the third topic (or head), safety in the forming judgments about things.<sup>2</sup> If death surprises me when I am busy about these things, it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God and say: The means which I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of the world) and following it, I have not neglected; I have not dishonoured thee by my acts; see how I have used my perceptions, see how I have used my preconceptions; have I ever blamed thee? have I been discontented with anything that happens, or wished it to be otherwise? have I wished to transgress the (established) relations (of things)? That thou hast given me life, I thank thee for what thou hast given; so long as

<sup>2</sup> See iii. c. 2.

I have used the things which are thine I am content ; take them back and place them wherever thou mayest choose ; for thine were all things, thou gavest them to me.<sup>3</sup>—Is it not enough to depart in this state of mind, and what life is better and more becoming than that of a man who is in this state of mind ? and what end is more happy ?<sup>4</sup>

But that this may be done (that such a declaration may be made), a man must receive (bear) no small things, nor are the things small which he must lose (go without). You cannot both wish to be a consul and to have these things (the power of making such a dying speech), and to be eager to have lands, and these things also ; and to be solicitous about slaves and about yourself. But if you wish for anything which belongs to another, that which is your own is lost. This is the nature of the thing : nothing is given or had for nothing.<sup>5</sup> And where is the wonder ? If you wish to be a consul, you must keep awake, run about, kiss hands, waste yourself with exhaustion at other men's doors, say and do many things unworthy of a free man, send gifts to many, daily presents to some. And what is the thing that is got ? Twelve bundles of rods (the consular fasces), to sit three or four times on the tribunal, to exhibit the games in the Circus and

<sup>3</sup> " 'Thine were they, and thou gavest them to me.' John xvii. 6."—Mrs. Carter.

<sup>4</sup> See note 44 at end.

<sup>5</sup> See iv. 2.



Patroclus or Antilochus or Menelaus? <sup>10</sup> For when did he suppose that any of his friends was immortal, and when had he not before his eyes that on the morrow or the day after he or his friend must die? Yes, he says, but I thought that he would survive me and bring up my son. —You were a fool for that reason, and you were thinking of what was uncertain. Why then do you not blame yourself, and sit crying like girls? —But he used to set my food before me.—Because he was alive, you fool, but now he cannot; but Automedon <sup>11</sup> will set it before you, and if Automedon also dies, you will find another. But if the pot, in which your meat was cooked, should be broken, must you die of hunger, because you have not the pot which you are accustomed to? Do you not send and buy a new pot? He says:

No greater ill than this could fall on me. (*Iliad*, xix. 321.)

Why is this your ill? Do you then instead of removing it blame your mother (Thetis) for not foretelling it to you that you might continue grieving from that time? What do you think? Do you not suppose that Homer wrote this that we may learn that those of noblest birth, the strongest and the richest, the most handsome, when they have not the opinions which they ought to have, are not prevented from being most wretched and unfortunate?

<sup>10</sup> Epictetus refers to the passage in the *Iliad*, xxiv. 5, where Achilles is lamenting the death of Patroclus and cannot sleep.

<sup>11</sup> See note 45 at end.

## CHAPTER XI.

### ABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS).

SOME persons raise a question whether the social feeling<sup>1</sup> is contained in the nature of man ; and yet I think that these same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainly contained in it, and that if man is distinguished from other animals by anything, he is distinguished by this. When then we see any other animal cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man ; and on the other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway, as if we were making an excuse for it, we say that of course the animal is not a human creature. So we suppose that there is something superior in man, and that we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by their nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men approach them by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to a love (habit) of purity. But since it is impossible that man's nature (*οἶσις*) can be altogether pure being mixed (composed) of such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is possible, and reason endeavours to make human nature love purity.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The word is *τὸ κοινωνικόν*. Compare i. 23, ii. 10, ii. 20.

<sup>2</sup> In the text there are two words, *καθαρός* which means "pure," and *καθαρίσις* which means "of a pure nature," "loving purity."

The first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul ; and we say the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of the soul as you could discover that of the body ; but as to the soul, what else could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which are her own ? Now the acts of the soul are movement towards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these acts makes the soul filthy and impure ? Nothing else than her own bad judgments (*κρίματα*). Consequently the impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the purification of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions ; and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollution.

Now we ought to work at something like this in the body also, as far as we can. It was impossible for the defluxions of the nose not to run when man has such a mixture in his body. For this reason nature has made hands and the nostrils themselves as channels for carrying off the humours. If then a man sucks up the defluxions, I say that he is not doing the act of a man. It was impossible for a man's feet not to be made muddy and not be soiled at all when he passes through dirty places. For this reason nature (God) has made water and hands. It was impossible that some impurity should not remain in the teeth from eating. For this reason,

she says, wash the teeth. Why? In order that you may be a man and not a wild beast or a hog. It was impossible that from the sweat and the pressing of the clothes there should not remain some impurity about the body which requires to be cleaned away. For this reason water, oil, hands, towels, scrapers (strigils),<sup>3</sup> nitre, sometimes all other kinds of means are necessary for cleaning the body. You do not act so; but the smith will take off the rust from the iron (instruments), and he will have tools prepared for this purpose, and you yourself wash the platter when you are going to eat, if you are not completely impure and dirty: but will you not wash the body nor make it clean? Why? he replies. I will tell you again: in the first place, that you may do the acts of a man; then, that you may not be disagreeable to those with whom you associate. You do something of this kind even in this matter, and you do not perceive it; you think that you deserve to stink. Let it be so; deserve to stink. Do you think that also those who sit by you, those who recline at table with

<sup>3</sup> The *ξύρρα*, as Epictetus names it, was the Roman "strigilis," which was used for the scraping and cleaning of the body in bathing. Persius (v. 126) writes:

I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer.

The strigiles "were of bronze or iron of various forms. They were applied to the body much in the same way as we see a piece of hoop applied to a sweating horse."—Pompeii, edited by Dr. Dyer.

you, that those who kiss you deserve the same? <sup>4</sup> Either go into a desert, where you deserve to go, or live by yourself, and smell yourself. For it is just that you alone should enjoy your own impurity. But when you are in a city, to behave so inconsiderately and foolishly, to what character do you think that it belongs? If nature had entrusted to you a horse, would you have overlooked and neglected him? And now think that you have been entrusted with your own body as with a horse; wash it, wipe it, take care that no man turns away from it, that no one gets out of the way for it. But who does not get out of the way of a dirty man, of a stinking man, of a man whose skin is foul, more than he does out of the way of a man who is daubed with muck? That smell is from without, it is put upon him; but the other smell is from want of care, from within, and in a manner from a body in putrefaction.

But Socrates washed himself seldom.—Yes, but his body was clean and fair; and it was so agreeable and sweet that the most beautiful and the most noble loved him, and desired to sit by him rather than by the side of those who had the handsomest forms. It was in his power neither to use the bath nor to wash himself, if he chose; and yet the rare use of water had an effect. [If

<sup>4</sup> If the text is right, the form of expression is inexact and does not clearly express the meaning; but the meaning may be easily discovered.

you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold.<sup>5</sup>] But Aristophanes says:

Those who are pale, unshod, 'tis those I mean.

(*Nubes*, v. 102.)

For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra.<sup>6</sup> But all who have written about Socrates bear exactly the contrary evidence in his favour; they say that he was pleasant not only to hear, but also to see.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, they write the same about Diogenes.<sup>8</sup> For we ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter the multitude from philosophy; but as in other things, a philosopher should show himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the things that relate to the body: See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want nothing; see how I am without a house, and without a city, and an exile, if it happens to be so,<sup>9</sup> and without a hearth I live more free from trouble and more happily than all of noble birth and the rich. But look at my poor body also, and observe that it is not injured by my hard way of living.—But if a man says this to me who has the appearance (dress) and face of a condemned man, what God shall per-

<sup>5</sup> See what is said of this passage in the latter part of this chapter.

<sup>6</sup> Aristophanes, *Nubes*, v. 225, and v. 179.

<sup>7</sup> Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 12.

<sup>8</sup> See iii. 22.

<sup>9</sup> Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town, Sinope, in Asia, on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage (Upton). It is probable that this is false.

suade me to approach philosophy, if it makes men such persons? Far from it; I would not choose to do so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I indeed would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed than with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain notion (appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt at) that which is becoming; and where he supposes it to be, there also he strives that it shall be. It is only necessary to show him (what it is), and to say: Young man, you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then that it (is produced) grows in that part of you where you have the rational faculty: seek it there where you have the movements towards and the movements from things, where you have the desires towards, and the aversion from things; for this is what you have in yourself of a superior kind; but the poor body is naturally only earth: why do you labour about it to no purpose? if you shall learn nothing else, you will learn from time that the body is nothing. But if a man comes to me daubed with filth, dirty, with a moustache down to his knees, what can I say to him, by what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For about what has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I may be able to change him and say, Beauty is not in this, but in that? Would you have me to tell him, that beauty consists not in being daubed with muck, but that it lies in the rational part?

Has he any desire of beauty? has he any form of it in his mind? Go and talk to a hog, and tell him not to roll in the mud.

For this reason the words of Xenocrates touched Polemon also, since he was a lover of beauty, for he entered (the room) having in him certain incitements (*ἐναύσματα*) to love of beauty, but he looked for it in the wrong place.<sup>10</sup> For nature has not made even the animals dirty which live with man. Does a horse ever wallow in the mud, or a well-bred dog? But the hog, and the dirty geese, and worms and spiders do, which are banished furthest from human intercourse. Do you then being a man choose to be not as one of the animals which live with man, but rather a worm, or a spider? Will you not wash yourself somewhere some time in such manner as you choose?<sup>11</sup> Will you not wash off the dirt from your body? Will you not come clean that those with whom you keep company may have pleasure in being with you? But do you go with us even into the temples in such a state, where it is not permitted to spit or blow the nose, being a heap of spittle and of snot?

What then? does any man (that is, do I) require you to ornament yourself? Far from it; except to ornament that which we really are by

<sup>10</sup> As to Polemon see iii. 1, note 2.

<sup>11</sup> It has been suggested that the words [if you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold, p. 239] belong to this place.



nature, the rational faculty, the opinions, the actions ; but as to the body only so far as purity, only so far as not to give offence. But if you are told that you ought not to wear garments dyed with purple, go and daub your cloak with muck or tear it.<sup>12</sup> But how shall I have a neat cloak ? Man, you have water ; wash it. Here is a youth worthy of being loved,<sup>13</sup> here is an old man worthy of loving and being loved in return, a fit person for a man to intrust to him a son's instruction, to whom daughters and young men shall come, if opportunity shall so happen, that the teacher shall deliver his lessons to them on a dunghill.<sup>14</sup> Let this not be so : every deviation comes from something which is in man's nature ; but this (deviation) is near being something not in man's nature.

<sup>12</sup> This is the literal translation ; but it means, "will you go, etc., tear it ?"

<sup>13</sup> "The youth, probably, means the scholar who neglects neatness ; and the old man, the tutor that gives him no precept or example of it."—Mrs. Carter.

<sup>14</sup> The Greek is λέγει τὰς σχολάς. Cicero uses the Latin "scholas habere," "to hold philosophical disputations" (Tusc. Disp. i. 4).—Upton.

## CHAPTER XII.

## ON ATTENTION.

WHEN you have remitted your attention for a short time, do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose ; but let this thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault committed to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not attending is formed in you ; then a habit of deferring your attention. And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper behaviour, the being and living conformably to nature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the complete omission of attention is more profitable ; but if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant?—To-day I choose to play.—Well then, ought you not to play with attention?—I choose to sing.—What then hinders you from doing so with attention? Is there any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? For will you do it (anything in life) worse by using attention, and better by not attending at all? And what else of the things in life is done better by those who do not use attention? Does he who works in wood work

better by not attending to it? Does the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending? and is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention? Do you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or to modesty, or to moderation; but you do everything that comes into your mind in obedience to your inclinations.

To what things then ought I to attend? First to those general (principles), and to have them in readiness, and without them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to eat, not to converse (associate) with men; that no man is master of another man's will, but that in the will alone is the good and the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for me any good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over myself have power in these things. When then these things are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external things? What tyrant is formidable, what disease, what poverty, what offence (from any man)? Well, I have not pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him) my work, my judgment? No. Why then should I trouble myself about him?—But he is supposed to be someone (of importance).—He will look to that himself; and those who think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please, to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey, God and those who are next to him.<sup>1</sup> He has placed me with

<sup>1</sup> Compare iv. 4, i. 14; and *Encheirid.* c. 32, and the remark

myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone, and has given me rules for the right use of it ; and when I follow these rules in syllogisms, I do not care for any man who says anything else (different) ; in sophistical argument, I care for no man. Why then in greater matters do those annoy me who blame me ? What is the cause of this perturbation ? Nothing else than because in this matter (topic) I am not disciplined. For all knowledge (science) despises ignorance and the ignorant ; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own work<sup>2</sup> (business). Produce any carpenter.

First, then, we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others (or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who has the power ; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to this, we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties

of Simplicius. Schweighaeuser explains the words τοῖς μετ' ἑαυτὸν thus : " qui post Illum (Deum) et sub Illo rebus humanis praesunt ; qui proximum ab Illo locum tenent."

<sup>2</sup> Compare ii. 13, and Antoninus, vi. 35 : " Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods ?"

towards the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the season for play, and in whose presence; what will be the consequence of the act;<sup>3</sup> whether our associates will despise us, whether we shall despise them;<sup>4</sup> when to jeer (*σκῶψαι*), and whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and, finally, in complying how to maintain our own character.<sup>5</sup> But wherever you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from anything external, but from the action itself.

What then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you do all this)? It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now when you have said, To-morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told that you are saying this, To-day I will be shameless, disregardful of time and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to give me pain; to-day I will be passionate, and envious. See how many evil things you are

<sup>3</sup> Schweighaeuser thinks that the text will be better translated according to Upton's notion and H. Stephen's (*hors de propos*) by "Quid sit abs re futurum," "what will be out of season." Perhaps he is right.

<sup>4</sup> Schweighaeuser says that the sense of the passage, as I have rendered it, requires the reading to be *καταφρονήσουσι*; and it is so, at least in the better Greek writers.

<sup>5</sup> See iii. 14, i. 29.

permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use attention to-morrow, how much better is it to do so to-day? if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend, much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to-morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.<sup>6</sup>

## CHAPTER XIII.

### AGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.

WHEN a man has seemed to us to have talked with simplicity (candour) about his own affairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to discover to him<sup>1</sup> our own secrets, and we think this to be candid behaviour? In the first place, because it seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his neighbour, and not to communicate to him also in turn our own affairs; next, because we think that we shall not present to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about our own affairs. Indeed, men are often

<sup>6</sup> Compare Antoninus, viii. 22: "Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion, or an act, or a word.

"Thou sufferest this justly, for thou choosest rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day."

<sup>1</sup> Schweighaeuser writes *τίς ποτε*, etc., and translates "excitatur quodammodo et ipsi," etc. He gives the meaning, but the *τίς ποτε* is properly a question.

accustomed to say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this done?—Besides, we have also this opinion, that we can safely trust him who has already told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our mind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak ill of Caesar; then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also what you think, and then you are carried off in chains.<sup>2</sup>

Something of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any man whom I meet? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a disposition; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has heard. Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturb others and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does not injure another, and that every man's acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not anything like him, but still I suffer what I do suffer through my own silly talk.

<sup>2</sup> See note 46 at end.

True ; but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate nothing to him.—Did I ask you for your secrets, my man? did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler, and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be like you? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me, and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash? It is just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me your wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your affairs to a man who is faithful and modest, to a man who thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor's palace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like Medea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, and steady ; show me that you have friendly opinions ; show that your cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall not



wait for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose to make use of a good vessel? Who does not value a benevolent and faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the difficulty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it.

True : but I trust you ; you do not trust me. —In the first place, not even do you trust me, but you are a babbler, and for this reason you cannot hold anything ; for indeed, if it is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only ; but now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by him and say : Brother, I have no friend more benevolent than you nor dearer ; I request you to listen to my affairs. And you do this even to those who are not known to you at all. But if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me because I am faithful and modest, not because I have told my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to another, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every man, if that would make me faithful and modest. But the thing is not so, and it requires no common opinions (principles). If then you see a man who is busy about things not dependent on his will, and subjecting his will to them, you must know that

this man has ten thousand persons to compel and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to compel him to declare what he knows ;<sup>3</sup> but a little girl's nod, if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of one who belongs to Caesar's court, desire of a magistracy or of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You must remember then among general principles that secret discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity and corresponding opinions. But where can we now find these easily ? Or if you cannot answer that question, let someone point out to me a man who can say : I care only about the things which are my own, the things which are not subject to hindrance, the things which are by nature free. This I hold to be the nature of the good ; but let all other things be as they are allowed ; I do not concern myself.

<sup>3</sup> The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract confessions.







## NOTES.

1 (p. 10). *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdly called "virtue" *καλόν* (beautiful), because it naturally "calls" (*καλεῖ*) to itself those who desire it. The Stoics also said that everything good was beautiful (*καλός*), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The Roman expression is "Vir bonus et sapiens" (Hor. Epp. i. 7, 22 and 16, 20). Perhaps the phrase *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being the combination of a perfect human being.

For the next sentence see Antoninus, xi. 37, "as to sensual desire he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power."

2 (p. 14). *τοὺς σιφάρους*. On this reading the student may consult the note in Schweighaeuser's edition. The word *σιφάρους*, if it is the right reading, is not clear; nor the meaning of this conclusion.

The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free

from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which is not the philosopher's condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour of hoisting the sails.

3 (p. 17). Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21-23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The "another" who compels is God, Schweighaeuser says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone everything else to that thing in which he places his Good; and he adds, that it is man's fault if he places his good in that thing in which God has not placed it.

Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is "compelled and allows himself to be carried away," etc. The notion of "compulsion" is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him "who sees," as the Latin poet says, "the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse."

4 (p. 23). Xenophon (Memorab. i. 6, 14); but Epicetetus does not quote the words, he only gives the meaning. Antoninus (viii. 43) says, "Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes, and using everything according to its value."

5 (p. 30). The MSS., with one exception, have *δογματίζων τὰ καλὰ, ποιῶν τὰ αἰσχροῦ*, but it was properly corrected by Wolf, as Upton remarks, who shows

from Cicero, de Fin. ii. 25 and 31, that the MSS. are wrong. In the second passage Cicero says, "nihil in hac praeclara epistola scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis ejus reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, vincunturque scripta ejus probitate ipsius ac moribus." See Epictetus, ii. 18.

Upton compares the next paragraph with the passage (v. 333) in the Cyclops of Euripides, who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage in public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. See Epictetus, i. 23, 3 and 6.

6 (p. 32). A "codicillus" is a small "codex," and the original sense of "codex" is a strong stem or stump. Lastly, it was used for a book, and even for a will. "Codicilli" were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament; but this sense is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de jure codicillorum.)

7 (p. 45). "To set up a palm tree." He does not mean a real palm tree, but something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned by Lucian, de Dea Syria (c. 29). Schweighaeuser has given the true interpretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a high piece of wood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what this is.

It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were covered with snow for the purpose of

exercising himself. I suppose bronze statues, not marble, which might be easily broken. The man would not remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general, setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was as a punishment.

8 (p. 50). This was the doctrine of Heraclitus, "that all things were composed from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it," an opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant, as it may appear to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way, and have a new beginning. See Seneca, Ep. 9, "*cum resolutio mundo, diis in unum confusis, paulisper cessante natura adquiescit sibi Jupiter, cogitationibus suis traditus.*"

9 (p. 50). The Latin translation is: "*hoc etiam nonnulli facturum eum in conflagratione mundi . . . aiunt.*" But the word is *ποιεῖ*; and this may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again. The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with the consideration of time. Even Herodotus (ii. 11), in his speculations on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of the possibility of it being filled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern speculators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the ignorant have conceived it.

10 (p. 52). "What a melancholy description of death, and how gloomy the ideas in this *consolatory* chapter! All beings reduced to mere elements in suc-

cessive conflagrations ! A noble contrast to the Stoic notions on this subject may be produced from several passages in the Scripture—‘Then shall the dust return to the earth, as it was ; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it,’ Eccles. xii. 7.”—Mrs. Carter ; who also refers to 1 Thess. iv. 14 ; John vi. 39, 40 ; xi. 25, 26 ; 1 Cor. vi. 14 ; xv. 53 ; 2 Cor. v. 14, etc.

Mrs. Carter quotes Ecclesiastes, but the author says nearly what Epicharmus said, quoted by Plutarch, *παραμυθ. πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον*, vol. i. p. 435, ed. Wyt :—

*συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθε πάλιν,  
γα̃ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ’ ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν ;  
οὐδὲ ἔν.*

Euripides in a fragment of the Chrysippus, fr. 836, ed. Nauck, says :

*τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας φύντ’ εἰς γαῖαν,  
τὰ δ’ ἀπ’ αἰθερίου βλαστόντα γονῆς  
εἰς οὐράνιον πάλιν ἦλθε πόλον.*

I have translated the words of Epictetus ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον by “of air (spirit), to air” ; but the πνευμάτιον of Epictetus may mean the same as the πνεῦμα of Epicharmus, and the same as the “spirit” of Ecclesiastes.

An English commentator says that “the doctrine of a future retribution forms the great basis and the leading truth of this book (Ecclesiastes),” and that “the royal Preacher (Ecclesiastes) brings forward the prospect of a future life and retribution.” I cannot discover any evidence of this assertion in the book. The conclusion is the best part of this ill-connected, obscure and confused book, as it appears in our translation. The conclusion is (xii. 13, 14) : “Fear God



and keep his commandments : for this is the whole duty of man, for God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil." This is all that I can discover in the book which can support the commentator's statement ; and even this may not mean what he affirms.

Schweighaeuser observes that here was the opportunity for Epictetus to say something of the immortality of the soul, if he had anything to say. But he says nothing unless he means to say that the soul, the spirit, "returns to God who gave it," as the Preacher says. There is a passage (iii. 24, 94) which appears to mean that the soul of man after death will be changed into something else, which the universe will require for some use or purpose. It is strange, observes Schweighaeuser, that Epictetus, who studied the philosophy of Socrates, and speaks so eloquently of man's capacity and his duty to God, should say no more ; but the explanation may be that he had no doctrine of man's immortality, in the sense in which that word is now used.

11 (p. 53). The text has *ἀρχομένων*, but it probably ought to be *ἀρχομένῃ*. Compare i. 1, 8, *πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλής*.

The text from *φέρειν οὖν δεῖ* to *τῷ φυσικῷ* is unintelligible. Lord Shaftesbury says that the passage is not corrupt, and he gives an explanation ; but Schweighaeuser says that the learned Englishman's exposition does not make the text plainer to him ; nor does it to me. Schweighaeuser observes that the passage which begins *πᾶσα μεγάλη* and what follows seem to belong to the next chapter xiv.

12 (p. 56). Compare *Encheiridion*, 29.

"This chapter has a great conformity to Luke xiv. 28, etc. But it is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious men: but Christianity requires and enables all to be such."—Mrs. Carter.

The passage in Luke contains a practical lesson, and so far is the same as the teaching of Epictetus; but the conclusion in v. 33 does not appear to be helped by what immediately precedes v. 28-32. The remark that Christianity "enables all to be such" is not true, unless Mrs. Carter gives to the word "enables" a meaning which I do not see.

13 (p. 66). The original is *θεωρητικῶν φαντασιῶν*, which is translated in the Latin version "*visa theoretica*," but this does not help us. Perhaps the author means any appearances which are presented to us either by the eyes or by the understanding; but I am not sure what he means. It is said in the *Index Graecitatis* (Schweighaeuser's ed.): "*φαντασίαι θεωρητικαί*, notiones theoreticae, iii. 20. 1, quibus opponuntur Practicae ad vitam regendam spectantes."

14 (p. 70). The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in iii. c. 7, and it is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice: "If we open our eyes, and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and efforts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the world, which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus had" (Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, p. 74).

15 (p. 71). This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of Epictetus in the matter of education; and some other remarks to the same effect

follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer, who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus, says : " It cannot be denied that in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible men and women ; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I maintain that the education of these schools is good for nothing—I do not propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and wise by a cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the discipline necessary for that purpose, and by the example of him who governs, directs, and instructs." Further, " My men and women teachers have something which the others have not : they have a purpose, an end in their system of education ; and what is education ? What is human life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry, order, and the exercise of moderate abilities ? Great abilities are rare, and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society."

16 (p. 73). This is a view of the fitness of a teacher which, as far as I know, is quite new ; and it is also true. Perhaps there was some vague notion of this kind in modern Europe at the time when teachers of youths were only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the present " Ordering of Deacons " in the Church of England, the person who is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following question by the bishop : " Do

you trust that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve God for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people?" "In the Ordering of Priests" this question is omitted, and another question only is put, which is used also in the Ordering of Deacons: "Do you think in your heart that you be truly called, according to the will of our Lord Jesus Christ," etc. The teacher ought to have God to advise him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He does not say how God will advise; perhaps he supposed that this advice might be given in the way in which Socrates said that he received it.

"Wisdom perhaps is not enough" to enable a man to take care of youths. Whatever "wisdom" may mean, it is true that a teacher should have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a reasonable living by his labour; if he seeks only money and wealth, he is on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying and selling, a butcher, or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. But the teacher has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into good men and women. Should he be "ordered" like a Deacon or a Priest, for his office is even more useful than that of Priest or Deacon? Some will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so.

17 (p. 78).

Quod petis hic est,

Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus.

Horace, Ep. i. 11, 30.

Willst du immer weiter schweifen?

Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah.

Lerne nur das Glück ergreifen,

Denn das Glück ist immer da.

Goethe, Gedichte.

18 (p. 82). "It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualification in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to be destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Gospel; whose great author had not *where to lay his head*; and which some in later ages have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of Diogenes in Epictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is too obvious to need any enlargement."—Mrs. Carter.

19 (p. 82). Some of the ancients, who called themselves philosophers, did blame God and his administration of the world; and there are men who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the world, he has the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says; and if he knows, as he must know, that he cannot alter the nature of man and the conditions of human life, he may think it wise to withdraw from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself; and if he does believe that there is a God, he may still think that his power of quitting the world is a power which

he may exercise when he chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long as they can, and some of them take care of themselves and of all that they possess; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer living in this world to leaving it, that their complaints are idle talk; and that being men of weak minds and great vanity they assume the philosopher's name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as dissatisfied as themselves those who have less means of making life tolerable. These grumblers are not the men who give their money or their labour or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and diminishing the unavoidable sufferings of human life; but they find it easier to blame God, when they believe in him; or to find fault with things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the conditions under which we live.

20 (p. 83). "E caelo descendit γυνῶθι σεαυτόν" (Juvenal, xi. 27). The expression "Know thyself" is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of knowledge; and no man has it completely.

Men either estimate their powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self-conceit, or arrogance; or they think too meanly of their powers, and do not accomplish what they might accomplish if they had reasonable self-confidence.

21 (p. 84). "Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love to enemies, Matthew v. 39-44. The reader will observe that Christ specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth; and requires of *all* his followers, what Epictetus describes only as the duty of one or two *extraordinary* persons, as such."—Mrs. Carter.

22 (p. 87). "It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (*ἀπερισπάστως*) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation, too, that the state of things was then (*ὡς ἐν παρατάξει*) like *that of an army prepared for battle*, nearly resembles the Apostle's (*ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη*) *present necessity*. St. Paul says, 2 Tim. ii. 4 (*οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται*, etc.), no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be (*ἐμπελεγμένον*) in relations, etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul's Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine."—Mrs. Carter.

I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that "if they cannot contain,

let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn." Accordingly his doctrine is "to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (1 Cor. vii. 2). Paul's view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not; he writes, "I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I." He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did.

In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the "minister of God" should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A "minister of God" should not be distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor.

23 (p. 112). The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer: "For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walk-



ing."—M. Antoninus, ix. 42. Compare Seneca, *de Vita Beata*, c. 9.

24 (p. 120). Upton altered the text *οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι*; *Οὐκ ἔσθ' ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, οἷον νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρεῖαν ἔχει*, into *οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι*; *Ἐσθ' ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, οἷον νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρεῖαν οὐκ ἔχει*. He says that he made the alteration without MS. authority, but that the sense requires the change. Schweighaeuser does not accept the alteration, nor do I. Schweighaeuser remarks that there may be some difficulty in the words *οἷον νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρεῖαν ἔχει*. He first supposes that the word "now" (*νῦν*) means after a man's death; but next he suggests that *ἄλλο τι οἷον* means "something different from that of which the world has now need." A reader might not discover that there is any difficulty. He might also suggest that *νῦν* ought to be omitted, for if it were omitted, the sense would be still plainer. See iii. 13, and iv. 7.

I am not sure if Epictetus ever uses *κόσμος* in the sense of "Universe," the "universum" of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epictetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated. The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doctrine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call rational and intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organization of his brain, which is superior to that of all other animals; and that what we name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old Greek hypothesis that at death the body returned to earth, from which it came, and the soul (*πνεῦμα*) returned to the regions above, from

which it came. I cannot discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doctrine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body. The opinions of Marcus Antoninus on this matter are contained in his book, iv. 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere ; but they are rather obscure. A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either in heaven or in hell ; for the modern scientific notion, as I suppose that it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven or a place hell (Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, p. 129).

We may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epictetus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during Nero's reign (A.D. 54-68) ; and it is affirmed, whether correctly or not, I do not undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to the Corinthians (Cor. i. 16, 8) in the beginning of A.D. 56. Epictetus, it is said, lived in Rome till the time of the expulsion of the philosophers by Domitian, when he retired to Nicopolis an old man, and taught there. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians (c. 15) contains his doctrine of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith ; but it is not understood by all in the same way.

Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins ; that he was buried and rose again on the third day ; and that after his resurrection he was seen by many persons. Then he asks, if Christ rose from the dead, how can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead ? " But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is

Christ not risen" (v. 13); and (v. 19), "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." But he affirms again (v. 20) that "Christ is risen and become the firstfruits of them that slept." In v. 32, he asks what advantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, "if the dead rise not: let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." He seems not to admit the value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead; and he seems to say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, because life is short, if we do not believe in a resurrection of the dead. It may be added that there is not any direct assertion in this chapter that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to heaven in any way. He then says (v. 35), "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" He answers this question (v. 36), "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die"; and he adds that "God giveth it (the seed) a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." We all know that the body, which is produced from the seed, is not the body "that shall be"; and we also know that the seed which is sown does not die, and that if the seed died, no body would be produced from such seed. His conclusion is that the dead "is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body" (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*). I believe that the commentators do not agree about this "spiritual body"; but it seems plain that Paul did not teach that the body which will rise will be the same as the body which is buried. He says (v. 50) that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Yet in the Apostles' Creed we pronounce our belief in the "resurrection of the

body"; but in the Nicene Creed it is said we look "for the resurrection of the dead," which is a different thing or may have a different meaning from "the resurrection of the body." In the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper years, the person to be baptized is asked, "Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty," etc., in the terms of the Church Creeds, but in place of the resurrection of the body or of the dead, he is asked if he believes "in the resurrection of the flesh."

The various opinions of divines of the English Church on the resurrection of the body are stated by A. Clissold in the "Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of E. Swedenborg, in a letter to Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, 1859, 2nd ed."

25 (p. 127). Upton supposed that the words ἄλλ' οὐχ ὅμοιον . . . to κακῶς ἐνεργῆσαι, in the translation, "But the one case is not" . . . to "fly from evil acts," are said by the adversary of Epictetus, and Mrs. Carter has followed Upton in the translation. But then there is no sense in the last sentence Οἱ πόνοι ἄρα, etc., in the translation, "Sufferings then," etc. The reader may consult Schweighaeuser's note. I suppose that Epictetus is speaking the words, "But the one case," etc., to the end of the chapter. The adversary, who is not punished like a slave, and has no pains to remind him of his faults, is supposed so far not to have felt the consequences of his bad acts; but Epictetus concludes that sufferings of a painful character would be useful to him, as they are to all persons who do what they ought not to do. There is perhaps some difficulty in the word *πειρασμίων*. But I think that Schweighaeuser has correctly explained the passage.

26 (p. 128). He supposes that the man who is dying

of hunger has also wife and children, who will suffer the same dreadful end. The consolation, if it is any, is that the rich and luxurious and kings will also die. The fact is true. Death is the lot of all. But a painful death by hunger cannot be alleviated by a man knowing that all must die in some way. It seems as if the philosopher expected that even women and children should be philosophers, and that the husband in his philosophy should calmly contemplate the death of wife and children by starvation. This is an example of the absurdity to which even a wise man carried his philosophy; and it is unworthy of the teacher's general good sense.

27 (p. 150). "In the matter of assent then": this is the third *τόπος* or "locus" or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1-5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is, to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds which begin with the words, "I believe," etc., he knows, or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief; but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God if he denies that which he believes. The un-

believer will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe, or, in other words, his publication of a lie which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to anything which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances.

To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when he believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 16) in the received text, as it now stands, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned" (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians, but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient; and it does not concern the present subject.

28 (p. 154). In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man's will to the will of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of

Epictetus that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God's will. The Christian martyr indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and death; the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we cannot therefore say that he would have been able to bear it.

29 (p. 158). "And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? 'Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe'! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master's exhortation to the persecuted Christian: 'Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven.'"—Mrs. Carter.

I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice.

The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future

happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right.

30 (p. 167). Compare Plato (Symposium, p. 206): "All men conceive both as to the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, our nature desires to procreate. But it cannot procreate in that which is ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and woman is generation; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting." See what is said in ii. 23, note 10, on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth; and therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man's duty is to labour in some way, and, if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which he has received; and this is also a divine act. Paul's opinion of marriage is contained in Cor. i. 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriage; at least he does not show that he has in this chapter. His teaching is impracticable, contrary to that of Epictetus, and to the nature and constitution of man, and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body of Christians who recommend and commend the so-called religious and unmarried life.

31 (p. 172). This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. "The life of the dead," says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero's friend,



"rests in the remembrance of the living." Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught ; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man's daily life and his intercourse with other men ; in other words, he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will ; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was, as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself (*γνῶθι σεαυτόν*) ; and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations ; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man ; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. "Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because, as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it (Xenophon, *Apol.* § 22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from

being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind" (*Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus*, by F. C. Baur).

This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However, the essay is well worth the trouble of reading.

The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. "What prejudices, what blindness must a man have," says Rousseau, "when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophizing tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that a man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God" (Rousseau, *Émile*, vol. iii. p. 166, Amsterdam, 1765).

32 (p. 179). See Bishop Butler's remarks in the Preface to his *Sermons*, vol. ii. He speaks of the "idle way of reading and considering things: by this means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of without the pain of attention; neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought, than great part of that which is spent in reading."

33 (p. 179). "The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what they will find it very difficult to believe, That because externals are not in our power, they are nothing to us. But in excuse for this frequent repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very few who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this foundation. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no one ever spoke so well in support of the argument as Epictetus. Yet, notwithstanding his great abilities and the force of his example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of success; and one sees from this circumstance as well as from others in the Stoic writings, That virtue cannot be maintained in the world without the hope of a future reward."—Mrs. Carter.

34 (p. 192). The allusion is to a passage (a fragment) in the *Cresphontes* of Euripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (*Tusc. Disp. i. 48*)—

ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους  
τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κάκα.  
τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον  
χαίροντας, εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

Herodotus (v. 4) says of the Trausi, a Thracian tribe: "when a child is born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it must suffer on coming into the world, and enumerate all the calamities of mankind; but when one dies, they hide him in the earth with rejoicing and pleasure, reckoning all

the evils from which he is now released and in possession of all happiness."

35 (p. 192). This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise, fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, in a letter to Upton, says that he can discover no reason for Nero's coins being rejected in commercial dealings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth (Suetonius, Nero, c. 49). When Domitian was murdered, the Senate ordered his busts to be taken down, as the French now do after a revolution, and all memorials of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 23). Dion also reports (lx.) that when Caligula was murdered, it was ordered that all the brass coin which bore his image should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again. There is more on this subject in Wise's letter.

I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would not touch the coins of the detestable Nero.

36 (p. 196). Socrates' wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son Lamprocles with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endurance (Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 7). Xenophon in this chapter has reported the conversation of Socrates with his son on this matter.

Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring water on the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca says (De Constantia, c. 18). Aelian (xi. 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large

and good cake, which Xanthippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only laughed and said, Well then, you will not have your share of it. The philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the greatest calamities that can happen to a man, and the trouble of an undutiful son.

37 (p. 198). Here it is implied that there are things which God cannot do. Perhaps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will, and therefore of action, he cannot at the same time exercise the contradictory powers of forcing man's will and action; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (*Analogy*, chap. 5) "the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of virtue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a discipline of vice." In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be convinced in the present constitution of things "what things are good and bad."

38 (p. 203). Schweighaeuser says that he has not observed that this proverb is mentioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10. 24), "*alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet.*" I think that the context explains it: if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for that end.

39 (p. 206). See Schweighaeuser's note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some

examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behaviour of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority ; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions ; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused.

40 (p. 213). The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, if we use the word law in the strict sense of law ; for law is a general command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed ; or if not to enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word "law" is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word "law" in the strict sense.

41 (p. 214). This term (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*) has been often used by Epictetus (i. 26. 15, etc.), and by M. Antoninus. Here Epictetus gives a definition or description of it : it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and determine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected ; but still it ought to be what its constitution forms it to be, a faculty which "plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification" (Bp. Butler, Preface to his Sermons). The words in the text (*ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον*, selection and rejection) are expressed by Cicero (De Fin. ix. ii. 11) by "eligere" and "rejicere."

42 (p. 227). Virtue is its own reward, said the Stoics. This is the meaning of Epictetus, and it is consistent with his principles that a man should live conformably to his nature, and so he will have all the happiness of which human nature is capable. Mrs. Carter has a note here, which I do not copy, and I hardly understand. It seems to refer to the Christian doctrine of a man being rewarded in a future life according to his works; but we have no evidence that Epictetus believed in a future life, and he therefore could not go further than to maintain that virtuous behaviour is the best thing in this short life, and will give a man the happiness which he can obtain in no other way.

43 (p. 229). See a passage in Plutarch on Tranquillity from Euripides, the great storehouse of noble thoughts, from which ancient writers drew much good matter; and perhaps it was one of the reasons why so many of his plays and fragments have been preserved.

We must not quarrel with the things that are,  
For they care not for us; but he who feels them,  
If he disposes well of things, fares well.

44 (p. 231). "I wish it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by applying it to the ideal perfect character; but it is in a general way that Epictetus hath proposed such a dying speech as cannot without shocking arrogance be uttered by anyone born to die. Unmixed as it is with any acknowledgment of faults or imperfections at present, or with any sense of guilt on account of the past, it must give every sober reader a very disadvantageous opinion of some principles of the philosophy on which it is founded, as contradictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on absolute ignorance or neglect of the condition and

circumstances of such a creature as man."—Mrs. Carter.

I am inclined to think that Epictetus does refer to the "ideal perfect character"; but others may not understand him in this way. When Mrs. Carter says "but it is in a general . . . dying speech," she can hardly suppose, as her words seem to mean, that Epictetus proposed such a dying speech for every man or even for many men, for he knew and has told us how bad many men are, and how few are good according to his measure and rule; in fact, his meaning is plainly expressed. The dying speech may even be stronger in the sense in which Mrs. Carter understands it, in my translation, where I have rendered one passage in the text by the words, "I have not dishonoured thee by my acts," which she translates, "as far as in me lay, I have not dishonoured thee"; which apparently means, "as far as I could, I have not dishonoured thee." The Latin translation, "quantum in me fuit," seems rather ambiguous to me.

There is a general confession of sins in the prayer book of the Church of England, part of which Epictetus would not have rejected, I think. Of course the words which form the peculiar Christian character of the confession would have been unintelligible to him. It is a confession which all persons of all conditions are supposed to make. If all persons made the confession with sincerity, it ought to produce a corresponding behaviour, and make men more ready to be kind to one another, for all who use it confess that they fail in their duty, and it ought to lower pride and banish arrogance from the behaviour of those who in wealth and condition are elevated above the multitude. But I have seen it somewhere said, I cannot



remember where, but said in no friendly spirit to Christian prayer, that some men, both priests and laymen, prostrate themselves in humility before God and indemnify themselves by arrogance to man.

45 (p. 234). "This is a wretched idea of friendship; but a necessary consequence of the Stoic system. What a fine contrast to this gloomy consolation are the noble sentiments of an Apostle? Value your deceased friend, says Epictetus, as a broken pipkin; forget him, as a thing worthless, lost and destroyed. St. Paul, on the contrary, comforts the mourning survivors; bidding them not sorrow as those who have no hope; but remember that the death of good persons is only a sleep, from which they will soon arise to a happy immortality."—Mrs. Carter.

Epictetus does not say, "value your deceased friend as a broken pipkin." Achilles laments that he has lost the services of his friend at table, a vulgar kind of complaint; he is thinking of his own loss, instead of his friend. The answer is, such a loss as he laments is easily repaired: the loss of such a friend is as easily repaired as the loss of a cooking vessel. Mrs. Carter in her zeal to contrast the teaching of the Apostle with that of Epictetus seems to forget for the time that Epictetus, so far as we know, did not accept or did not teach the doctrine of a future life. As to what he thought of friendship, if it was a real friendship, such as we can conceive, I am sure that he did not think of it as Mrs. Carter says that he did; for true friendship implies many of the virtues which Epictetus taught and practised. He has a chapter on Friendship, ii. 22, which I suppose that Mrs. Carter did not think of when she wrote this note.

46 (p. 248). The man, whether a soldier or not, was

an<sup>1</sup> informer, one of those vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He was what Juvenal names a "delator." Upton, who refers to the life of Hadrian by Aelius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing soldiers named *Frumentarii* for the purpose of discovering what was said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke iii. 14), in answer to the question of the soldiers, "And what shall we do?" said unto them, "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages." Upton.





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# IN TUNE WITH THE INFINITE

or

Fullness of Peace, Power, and Plenty

By RALPH WALDO TRINE

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## PAGE 145.

What one lives in his invisible, thought world he is continually actualizing in his visible, material world. If he would have conditions different in the latter he must make the necessary changes in the former. A clear realization of this great fact would bring success to thousands of men and women who all about us are in the depths of despair. It would bring health, abounding health and strength to thousands now diseased and suffering. It would bring peace and joy to thousands now unhappy and ill at ease. \* \* \*

## PAGE 180.

When apparent adversity comes, be not cast down by it, but make the best of it, and always look forward for better things, to conditions more prosperous. To hold yourself in this attitude of mind is to set into operation subtle, silent, irresistible forces that sooner or later will actualize in material form that which is today merely an idea. But ideas have occult power, and ideas, when rightly planted and rightly tended, are the seeds that actualize material conditions. \* \* \*

## PAGE 144.

Thoughts of strength both build strength from within and attract from without. Thoughts of weakness actualize weakness from within and attract it from without. Courage begets strength, fear begets weakness. And so courage begets success, fear begets failure. \* \* \*

## PAGE 50.

The only thing that any drug or any medicine can do is to remove obstructions, that the life forces may have simply a better chance to do their work. *The real healing process must be performed by the operation of the life forces within.* \* \* \* There are almost countless numbers to-day, weak and suffering in body, who could become strong and healthy if they would only give God an opportunity to do His work. To such I would say, *Don't shut*

*out the divine inflow.* Do anything else rather than this. Open yourselves to it; invite it. In the degree that you open yourselves to it, its inflowing tide will course through your bodies & force so vital that the old obstructions that are dominating them to-day will be driven out before it. \* \* \*

PAGE 72.

Fear and worry and all kindred mental states are too expensive for any person, man, woman, or child, to entertain or indulge in. Fear paralyzes healthy action, worry corrodes and pulls down the organism, and will finally tear it to pieces. Nothing is to be gained by it, but everything to be lost: \* \* \*

## EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS

I cannot withhold any longer the joy and peace that is mine since reading "In Tune with the Infinite." It has given me more inspiration, more joy, more peace, more love, and more of everything that is good than any book I have ever read, and when I say this I do not except even the Bible.—A. S. F.

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